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Introduction
In basic studies of economics, you start learning about models with one agent or even
one representative agent. Later on, you learn what you have already known before:
People are not all the same. In consequence, the agents used in models may not be
symmetric or homogeneous as well. People are not homogeneous. One could say it is
especially the heterogeneity in premises, characteristics or in any other way that makes
a situation interesting to investigate. This fascination for heterogeneity in totally dif-
ferent aspects can be seen as driving force during my research and connects the three
chapters of this thesis.
In the first chapter of this thesis, I investigate two players facing an asymmetric
starting situation.1 In this research we make use of aspects from behavioral economics.
The findings from behavioral science translated into economic models comprise the pos-
sibility of explaining human behavior even better and in more aspects. Even findings
that are puzzling at first appear to have an underlying structure and sense. Berger and
Pope (2011) found that basketball teams that are slightly trailing at half time have a
significantly higher probability to win the game in the end. They were able to reproduce
their findings in lab experiments.
This finding appears puzzling regarding the standard tournament literature. It
would be rational for the underdog to reduce his effort in order to safe energy as he has
a lower chance to win. With Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introducing their prospect
theory they encountered the finding that people feel losses stronger then gains. This
characteristic was included the concept of reference-dependent preferences by Köszegi
and Rabin (2006). These gain-loss utilities model a person’s valuation in relation to a
reference point. In case the person exceeds his goal, his gains will weight less compared
to losses of the same amount, occurring when the target is not met.
In order to explain the puzzling results presented by Berger and Pope (2011) , I
introduced the concept of reference-dependent preferences into a standard tournament
1This chapter is joined work with Dr. Jan Bergerhoff and has been published as Bergerhoff and
Vosen (2015).
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setting following Lazear and Rosen (1981). I aimed to capture the motivation effect
included in the information of lying back slightly in a model. Could having a reference
point really make this behavior rational? Indeed we found that giving a head start
to one of the symmetric players leads to up to three different equilibria. Two of them
appear to resemble exactly the pattern described by Berger and Pope (2011). In their
related work, Gill and Stone (2010) were not able to find these additional equilibria due
to the simplifications they made. My results reveal, that the results from the simplified
model of Gill and Stone (2010) do not resemble the results from a more complex model
like the model presented in this thesis or the general model used by Gill and Stone
(2010) initially.
Analyzing the two new types of equilibria found, it can be noticed that they both
encounter the desired characteristics but, interestingly, they appear for totally different
reasons. One equilibrium (TAE2) can be seen as counterpart to the standard tour-
nament outcome (CAE), where an increase in asymmetric makes both players reduce
their efforts. In case of a TAE2 the stronger player anticipates that the underdog will
choose a very high effort in order to prevent the pain of loosing and decides to resign
as the effort needed to win would be to high for him; this again is anticipated by the
underdog. The second equilibrium type (TAE1) is totally different. In this case, none
of the players back off but both provide very high efforts. From a marketing perspective
this equilibrium would be the most favorable in sports contests as they will be the most
exciting ones.
The next chapter covers some marketing aspects as well. I am modeling a tour-
nament between asymmetric firms competing for customers on the new media. As I
grew up as part of the generation of digital natives I naturally entered a world with
new channels of entertainment, information and advertisement. The new media such
as blogs, video platforms or podcasts opened new possibilities to create content and to
express your opinion on nearly everything to the public. These channels are usually
hosted by one person who is in focus. He creates content on e.g. his experiences with
certain products. This way of reviewing products is totally different to evaluations
made by official or independent institutions who have the intention to give an objec-
tive opinion on the products being tested. In contrast, to this anonymous objective
evaluation, the host is known to his followers. For this reason, subjective opinions can
be used as source as well and can even capture more valuable information for consumers.
In the second chapter, I capture these components of objective and subjective cri-
teria in a reviewing process in a contest situation starting with a standard Tullock
contest. I consider only objective criteria at first combining them with the possibility
of losing customers due to a bad review. Afterwards, I present a possibility to adapt the
model to subjective criteria i.e. the taste of the host. Finally, I present a model where
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both aspects, subjective and objective, are combined. It can be seen that these contests
can be an attractive opportunity to gain customers for specific firms. Furthermore,
these contests may enforce high quality in products from well established companies.
Especially having both criteria combined is most likely to increase the utility for the
consumers. Additionally, I show that the optimization is not necessarily always fulfilled
in case of using two instruments in a Tullock contest. This criterion is missing in the
related work of Epstein and Hefeker (2003). Furthermore, I indicate an implication
where this missing condition may change results in their work.
The essential insight, provided in this chapter, is that even these new online com-
munities can be captured using wellknown models. Combining these with the new
characteristics observed allows us to learn more about some driving mechanisms re-
garding the new media. As online communities will become even more important,
scientific work in this field will be very important to gain insights about the modern
life basing on the new media.
The third chapter can be seen as a real project of the heart as it investigates a cir-
cumstance I was confronted with repeatedly during my whole academic career. Starting
my Bachelor studies in Bonn there was only one female professor who left before I got
my Bachelor degree. The absence of female professors in combination with being moti-
vated to become a professor increases once sensitivity for the fact of studying in a male
dominated field. Fortunately, during my PhD studies, the number of female professors
and junior professors increased. In consequence, I wanted to know what was happening
in male dominated academic fields. What was changing and what could be influencing
the career decisions of women on the one hand and the hiring decisions of the faculties
on the other hand.
I present a dataset on PhD graduates in BA especially collected for this purpose
combined with an existing dataset on BA professors in Germany. The changes over the
last decades are illustrated and compared to data from the US using a variety of fields
to set the collected data in context. It can be shown that the percentage of female
professors exhibits a significant kink during the nineties. In this period, the majority
of federal states in Germany introduced changes in laws to increase the gender equality
in the labor market. For this reason, I performed an event study with the year of the
change in law as period zero to even out the different years of implementation. The
results suggest a connection between the changes in law and the sudden increase in
female professors.
Further analysis of the data set showed a significant correlation between the gender
composition of the fellow students and the decision to become a professor. The gender
composition of the faculty seems to influence the decision to become a professor as well.
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The presence of female professors increases the decision in favor of the professorship
significantly. In contrast, a correlation between the gender composition of a faculty and
the hiring decision could not be found. The gender of the supervisor does not seem to
have any influence on the decision to become a professor.
Interestingly, the data reveal that the transition rate for becoming a professor has
become equal for female and male PhD students during the last years. This means, the
percentage of female PhDs choosing to become a professor in comparison to all female
PhDs is the same as the number of male PhDs opting for this career compared to the
total of male PhDs. This is a very profound finding as it contradicts the hypothesis of
a glass ceiling problem in this field and it shows that the women that choose to make
a PhD decide for an academic career as often as their male colleagues. In consequence,
the bottleneck seems to be not between PhD and professorship but even before the
stage of becoming a doctoral student. This appears to be an important insight that
could be helpful for further attempts to increase the gender equality in male dominated
academic fields.
Chapter 1
Can being behind get you ahead?
Reference Dependence and Asymmetric
Equilibria in an Unfair Tournament
Everyone remembers a plot where a disadvantaged individual facing the
prospect of failure, spends more effort, turns around the game and wins
unexpectedly. Most tournament theories, however, predict the opposite
pattern and see the disadvantaged agent investing less effort. We show
that ’turn arounds’, i.e. situations where the trailing player spends more
effort and becomes the likely winner of the tournament, can be the outcome
of a Nash equilibrium when the initial unevenness is known and players
have reference-dependent preferences. Under certain conditions, they are
the only pure strategy equilibrium. If the initial unevenness is large enough
the advantaged player will always invest the most effort. We also show that
equilibria in which the player behind catches up without becoming the likely
winner do not exist.
1. Introduction
Rank order tournaments are a common mechanism for providing social and economic
order. They are somewhat special, because they tie the privilege of receiving a certain
good or benefit to the effort of performing best at some productive task. Politicians
need to convince their constituents to be elected and business men need to create value
for their company to be considered for promotion. Especially when high stakes are
involved any indication of the likely outcome of a tournament is an asset. Consider
for example the large betting industry that offers bets at dynamic quotes during the
progress of many publicly fought contests.
Many times tournaments are not entirely fair with one player, for example, having
more information or better relations with the tournament decider. However, even more
often such unevenness occurs in dynamic contests. Most real world tournaments are
dynamic in the sense that they require repeated decisions by the competitors between
which contestants can process new information and recalibrate their tactics and effort
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investment. The most general piece of new information is the intermediate score which
exists in most tournament settings. Politicians obtain interims feedback through opin-
ion polls and direct contact, students write mid-term or mock exams and sports men
can usually collect a time or score signalling their relative position in the tournament.
That such feedback is entirely even seems to be the exception rather than the rule.1
Previous research like the work on dynamic tournaments by Chan et al. (2009) or
Aoyagi (2010) found that equilibria are “effort-symmetric” with respect to feedback.
This means that independent of the interims feedback, both competitors invest the
same level of effort and only the sum of efforts decreases the more uneven the feedback
is. Without any difference in effort provisions and the corresponding changes in the
relative winning probabilities these tournaments are essentially decided by the initial
unevenness and chance. Providing information about the intermediate state of the game
does not matter for the tournament outcome. The implicit assumption here is that the
interims feedback does not affect the agent’s utility directly. In such a world, a victory
against all odds that follows a drastic comeback after having been far behind initially
is the same as any other victory in terms of utility.
Gill and Stone (2010) were the first to account for the direct effect of feedback on
utility by introducing “fairness and desert” concerns in the form of reference-dependent
preferences. They investigate the influence of experiencing something as deserved on
equilibrium formation. Focussing on effort-symmetric equilibria they could show that
for uneven games, symmetric effort equilibria, in which the interims score is immaterial
to the outcome of the tournament, do not exist. However, currently it is not clear
whether asymmetric equilibria exist and if so whether they favour the victory of the
player ahead or behind.2
Gill and Stone (2010) derive predictions for asymmetric equilibria, but only for the
case where chance in the game is uniformly distributed. Uniformly distributed errors
are commonly used in economic models and laboratory experiments. Indeed, without
further knowledge of the situation at hand it may be as well-suited as any other distri-
bution. However, when thinking about many examples of rank order tournaments the
assumption that all random events, no matter how extreme, are equally likely and that
at the same time more extreme events carry probability of zero appears odd. In many
tournament applications like job or sport contests the notion that extreme events can
happen, but do so with a low probability, has an intuitive appeal.3
1How humans react to feedback is not yet fully understood. One potentially related idea is the
concept of cognitive dissonance Festinger (1962), which proposes that anyone who holds contradictory
beliefs will try to actively reduce this dissonance. Adjusting one’s reference categories could be seen
as one way to overcome the dissonance between the desire for a certain prize and the naturally limited
resources to obtain it.
2In a new article Dato et al. (2015) further explore the circumstances under which symmetric
equilibria arise.
3Stern (1991) investigates score differences in football and cannot reject that they are normally
distributed.
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With uniformly distributed errors Gill and Stone (2010) find that just one class of
equilibria exists, in which the player ahead always spends more effort than the trailing
player. This chapter makes new and very different predictions for the same setting
when uncertainty is normally distributed. We find that, depending on the strength of
the reference-dependence, the tournament prize and the initial unevenness three dif-
ferent classes of equilibria exist. Remarkably, in two of these classes the player being
behind overtakes the opponent and ends up with a higher probability of winning the
tournament. In tournaments where the initial unevenness is strongly favourable for one
party we find a unique equilibrium, in which the leading player extends the lead by
investing more effort than the player behind. However, when the game is tight and
the tournament prize is large enough to motivate the trailing player to overcome the
initial disadvantage, equilibria where the player behind spends much more effort than
the player ahead and obtains a higher probability of winning the tournament, always
exist.
In the first class of what we call Turn Around Equilibria (TAE) the agent behind
turns a marginal disadvantage ex ante, a 48 percent probability of winning, into a
marginal advantage with slightly more than a 53 percent chance of winning. In the
second class, the turn around can be much more pronounced. Here a trailing player
starting with a winning probability of say around 30 percent may turn the game into one
which yields almost certain victory with the winning probability exceeding 90 percent.
We show that whenever the player behind catches up on the opponent the extra effort
will be sufficient to overcome, and even exceed the entire initial disadvantage. Situa-
tions where the trailing player makes up some of the disadvantage without becoming
the favourite winner do not exist in equilibrium. We show that depending on parameter
values, the only possible pure strategy equilibrium is one in which the disadvantaged
player turns the game. Lastly, we predict that equilibria where one agent catches up
without taking the lead do not exist.
The model is set up as a version of the tournament formulated by Lazear and Rosen
(1981) with the defining characteristic that the element of chance enters additively into
the contest success function. Since we introduce reference-dependent preferences we use
the notion of choice acclimating personal equilibrium, that was introduced by Kőszegi
and Rabin (2007), in which the reference point is endogenous to maximisation process
as a solution concept. This means that agents take into account that their effort choice
affects their reference utility, i.e. that a high effort level makes winning more likely and,
hence, increases the reference point.
We contribute to a growing literature taking an interest in dynamic and uneven tour-
naments. Contributions like Gill and Stone (2010) discuss that in a dynamic setting
agents have time to emotionally react to events and deviate from standard rationality.
How emotions within a sports game can impact the motivation and ability of players
psychologically is described by Lazarus (2000). Klaassen and Magnus (2001) support
this notion empirically by showing, with a large data set of tennis matches, that points
in tennis are not individually and identically distributed. Gill and Prowse (2012) con-
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firm experimentally the key economic concept of strategy functions where the effort of
one agent crowds out the effort of the competitor. They introduce a dynamic frame by
letting subjects choose their effort sequentially providing complete information about
the choice of the first subject. Ederer (2010) studies asymmetric equilibria as a result of
asymmetrically distributed ability between two agents. In his model interim feedback
gives competitors the chance to update their beliefs about their opponent’s ability. This
leaves the agent who is ahead in the game more confident of the value of his own effort
investment and results in relatively greater effort provision from the leading player.
Our model provides a theoretical explanation for the existence of turn arounds.
Our results can explain the puzzling empirical evidence presented by Berger and Pope
(2011), who investigate data from 18, 060 American basketball games and find that
teams which are slightly behind at half time have a significantly higher probability to
win the game. As basketball is a complex sport it could be argued, for example, that
their results are not directly linked to effort investment. However, they consolidate
their finding by running an experiment in a controlled laboratory environment where
participants had to compete in a real effort task that involved fast clicking and were
told an intermediate score at half time. Those who were slightly behind at half time
showed a marked increase in clicks in the second half compared to those who were ahead
or to the no feedback control group. Previous literature was not able to explain this
pattern.4
2. The Model
The model studies a contest with two players j ∈ {A,B} who exert effort ej. The initial
unevenness is given by δ1 which represents an advantage for Player A when positive and
vice versa. The parameter δ1 is exogenous and observable. The unobservable random
noise parameter  is not affected by effort and follows a normal distribution with mean
0 and variance σ2.5 The initial unevenness δ1, the shock term  and the two choice vari-
ables eA and eB constitute the final outcome which is determined by δ2 = δ1+eA−eB+.
The prize received by Player j is given by zj. If the player wins the tournament
the player receives the winner prize w, while the loser prize is normalised to zero.
Therefore: Player A wins if δ2 > 0 and receives zA = w, while Player B obtains zB = 0
and vice versa. In this setting, the probability that Player A wins the contest equals
Prob(δ2 > 0) which implies Prob( > −δ1 + eB − eA). Using the fact that  is normally
distributed we can rewrite this as 1 − F (−δ1 + eB − eA) where F (·) is the cumulative
distribution function of the normal distribution. From the symmetry of the normal
4 In Ederer (2010) and Gill and Stone (2010), for example, the only type of asymmetric equilibrium
is one, where the leading player exerts more effort than the disadvantaged opponent.
5To ensure pure-strategy equilibria the variance has to be sufficiently large as described in Lazear
and Rosen (1981).
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distribution it follows that:
Prob{A wins} = Prob(δ2 > 0) = 1− F (−δ1 + eB − eA) = F (δ1 + ∆e)
where ∆e = eA − eB
2.1 Utility with reference-dependent preferences
In the first part of our analysis we make no assumptions about how the reference points
{rA, rB} are formed. Instead, we study the additional incentives reference-dependence
imposes on the players. Afterwards, we investigate how a reference point contributes to
determine the tournament winner assuming that it is formed endogenously as described
by Köszegi and Rabin (2006).
A player’s utility under a reference point rj is given by:
U j = v(zj) +m(zj|rj)− c(ej) where m(zj|rj) =
η(w − rj) if j winsη(1 + θ)(0− rj) if j loses
and v(zj) = zj , c(ej) =
1
2(e
j)2 , η ≥ 0 , θ ≥ 0
We assume rj ∈ [0, w] as the reference point for the tournament prize should give us
a value between the lowest possible outcome and the highest possible outcome of the
tournament. The utility is composed of a convenient consumption part v, for which a
linear specification is used, the cost of effort provision c(ej) and a reference-dependent
term. The weight of the reference utility is calibrated by η, such that setting η = 0
returns the model without reference-dependence. The parameter θ introduces loss aver-
sion. It represents the difference between the disutility of falling short of the reference
point and the utility of exceeding it by one unit. We assume that losses loom larger
than gains and consequently take θ to be positive. We use quadratic costs of effort for
simplicity.
Both players choose an effort level to maximise their expected utility given the
unevenness δ1. Player A maximises expected utility with respect to eA. Consequently,
the optimisation problem for Player A can be written as:
max
eA
F (δ1 + ∆e)(w + η(w − rA)) + (1− F (δ1 + ∆e))(−η(1 + θ)rA)− c(eA).
The first term F (δ1 + ∆e)(w + η(w − rA)) represents the utility in case the agent
wins the tournament. It is added to the utility of losing (1−F (δ1 + ∆e))(−η(1 + θ)rA)
and the costs of effort which have to be paid independent of the outcome. We define
P j as winning-probability of player j, i.e. PA = F (δ1 + ∆e) and PB = 1− F (δ1 + ∆e).
The contribution of reference-dependent utility lies in adding the term below to the
standard objective function wF (δ1 + ∆e)− c(eA):
Rj := η
(
P jw − rj
[
1 + θ
(
1− P j
)])
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Except for the potentially different reference points and the individual winning prob-
ability the term Rj is the same for both players. While the sign of Rj depends on the
actual parameter values, it becomes apparent that a greater reference point reduces
the agents’ utility. This is intuitive as a higher reference point renders a victory less
sweat, but a defeat all the more bitter. Moreover, reference-dependence contributes an
incentive effect which is given by
∂RA
∂eA
= η
(
f(δ1 + ∆e)(w + rAθ)− ∂r
A
∂eA
[
1 + θ(1− PA)
])
.
The expression reveals the delicate nature of the effect which may take different
sizes locally over the decision space. The first term ηf(δ1 + ∆e)(w + rAθ) adds a posi-
tive incentive, that is caused by an increase of the effective prize spread. Since Lazear
and Rosen (1981) it has been known that when there are no participation constraints
an agent’s effort decision is not affected by the absolute level of prizes, but by the
spread between the winner and loser prize. reference-dependence increases the effective
prize spread, making the valuation of both tournament outcomes more extreme. The
strength of its impact, however, depends on the reference point rA which may take
different values for different {eA, eB, δ1}. The second term reduces to 0 in case of an
exogenous reference point as the derivative ∂rA
∂eA
remains 0.
2.2 Endogenous Reference Points
In the following we endogenise the reference points and employ the choice-acclimating
personal equilibrium concept of Köszegi and Rabin (2006) to derive the player’s first
and second order conditions. After establishing a necessary and sufficient condition for
the interiority of all solutions in Lemma 1, we show in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 that
both first and second order conditions can be reduced to one equivalent expression. We
proceed to define the three classes of equilibria and derive conditions for their existence
in Proposition 1 to Proposition 3. In Proposition 4 we give conditions for the unique-
ness of a Turn Around Equilibrium. Finally, in Proposition 5 we discuss a fourth class
of equilibria and interpret our results.
Modelling the reference point formation explicitly makes the precise effect of reference-
dependence tractable. We assume expectation based reference points, but remain ag-
nostic about whether expectations are formed as in the reference-dependence theory
of Köszegi and Rabin (2006) or as in disappointment aversion theory developed by
Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986). Additionally, we will allow the reference
point to adjust in the process. As solution concept we use choice-acclimating per-
sonal equilibria (CPE) that are defined “as a decision that maximises expected utility
given that it determines both the reference lottery and the outcome lottery" (p.1049,
Kőszegi and Rabin (2007)). In consequence, the reference points are taken to be the
endogenous winning probability of each player multiplied by the winner prize, which
constitutes the expected gain of each player. Explicitly, the reference points are mod-
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elled as rA = F (∆e+ δ1)w for Player A and rB = (1−F (∆e+ δ1))w for Player B.6 The
explicit reference point enables us to rewrite the contribution term RA for both players
to −wηθF (∆e + δ1)(1 − F (∆e + δ1)). The negative sign shows that each player has
an incentive to minimise this term. For player A this results in the following incentive
effect7:
∂RA
∂eA
= wηθf(δ1 + ∆e)(2F (δ1 + ∆e)− 1)
The derivative above is positive if δ1 +∆e > 0 and negative if δ1 +∆e < 0. The absolute
value of RA is highest for close games when δ1 + ∆e is zero and falls steadily when the
game gets less tight. In other words, players have an incentive to flee the middle and
avoid the uncertainty associated with close games, which has also been described by
Gill and Stone (2010). Note that the incentive does not point the player into a par-
ticular direction. Whether the player “gets ahead” or “falls behind” is not important.
Evenness at the end of the period is unattractive for agents with reference points since
it jointly maximises the size of the disutility from falling short of the reference point
weighted by the probability of its occurrence. With normally distributed chance in the
game, this opens up the possibility for multiple equilibria.
To understand this last point better consider Figure 1.1 which sketches both player’s
marginal costs and benefits.8 In the upper graph, which depicts the standard Lazear
and Rosen (1981) tournament without reference-dependence, both player’s marginal
benefit curves coincide with the equilibrium being reached at their peak. The effect
of reference-dependence in the lower graph of Figure 1.1 is to steepen and drive apart
both player’s marginal benefits. The peak of the marginal benefits of both players is
now located in the area where they themselves are more likely to win. Intuitively, both
players benefit most from their effort when they can use it not only to increase their
own winning probability, but also to decrease the uncertainty of the game. Here, with-
out further asymmetries (i.e. δ1 6= 0) the same symmetric equilibrium continues to exist.
This can also be seen in two top panels of Figure 1.2 which plots both players’
best response functions along with a 45 degree line for the given parameter values
η = 1, θ = 1, δ1 = 0.2, σ = 2 and w = 3pi. Moving from the top panel to the middle
one with reference-dependence the symmetric equilibrium is preserved. However, we
can now see that also two other potential asymmetric equilibria on either side do exist.
Again both players peak best response effort lies on the side of the 45 degree line where
they are more likely to win. When we introduce asymmetry in favour of Player A (i.e.
δ1 > 0) we can see that A’s peak best response effort moves towards the 45 degree line
while Player B’s moves away from it. From the intersections of the two functions we
can thus identify three potential equilibrium candidates, two of whom lie above the 45
6Like Gill and Stone (2010) we do not model a reference point in the effort domain. We believe
that further conceptual work on what a reference point in the effort domain could be is interesting and
could yield a valuable addition to this and other models. Yet with all its psychological and technical
implications it exceeds the scope of this chapter.
7The corresponding term for Player B is ∂R
∂eB
= wηθf(δ1 + ∆e)(1− 2F (δ1 + ∆e)).
8The marginal benefits are given by MBA = MBB = w ∗ f(δ1 + ∆e).
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degree line which implies that the disadvantaged player behind spends more effort than
the advantaged player.The best response functions have the simple structure:
eA = wf(δ1 + ∆e)
[
1 + ηθ
(
2F (δ1 + ∆e)− 1
]
= wf(x)
[
1 + γG(x)
]
eB = wf(δ1 + ∆e)
[
1− ηθ
(
2F (δ1 + ∆e)− 1)
]
= wf(x)
[
1− γG(x)
]
We define x = δ1 + ∆e, γ = ηθ and G(x) = 2F (x) − 1. The variable x, thus, rep-
resents the state of the game just before the random shock  is realised. Since the
two conditions for eA and eB must be fulfilled in equilibrium they provide information
about when equilibria are interior, i.e. when both agents provide strictly positive effort.
From wf(x) > 0 we know that there is an interior solution whenever (1 + γG(x)) and
(1− γG(x)) are both strictly greater than zero. Small rearrangement implies that both
conditions are fulfilled whenever γ < | 1
G(x) |. Since the set of possible values of |G(x)|
which is bounded above by one,9 a simple corollary is that for γ ≤ 1 the condition is ful-
filled and the corresponding equilibrium must be interior. This leads to the first lemma.
9|G(x)| = |2F (x) − 1| converges to 1, since the cdf of the normal distribution converges to 0 for
x→ −∞ and to 1 for x→∞.
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Figure 1.1: The Figure shows the Marginal Costs and Benefits of both players.
Player B’s effort increases from left to right. In the top panel without reference-
dependence (γ = 0) marginal benefits of both players are identical. Introducing
reference-dependence changes that. The Marginal Benefit curves are now only equal at
the equilibrium effort levels, which without initial asymmetry are still symmetic (they
are equal to two in this case).
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Figure 1.2: Effort combinations which fulfil each players First Order Condition. All
intersections are potential equilibrium candidates. Below the 45 line Player A exerts
greater effort, above it Player B exerts more. The top panel assumes w = 3pi and
σ = 2. In the middle panel the reference-dependence parameter γ = 1. In the lower
panel Player A is additionally given an advantage of δ1 = 0.2.
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Lemma 1. An equilibrium is interior if γ < | 1
G(x) |. Therefore all equilibria are interior
whenever γ ≤ 1.
All lemmas and propositions are proven formally in Appendix 1. The term 1
G(x)
is always defined as G(x) 6= 0 for all x that describe equilibria. To ensure that all
equilibria are interior, we will assume γ < | 1
G(x) |. This is not a restrictive assumption as
for any x, |G(x)| is always between zero at the origin and one as x becomes arbitrarily
small or large. Hence, all moderate forms of loss aversion where γ ≤ 1 are covered as
well as many stronger versions depending on the degree of the state of the game x.
For simplification we proceed by combining both first order conditions as well as
both second order conditions to obtain two new functions we term candidate and max-
imum condition function.
Lemma 2. The system of first order conditions can be expressed as the candidate func-
tion δ1 = x − 2wγf(x)G(x). All combinations of {eA, eB, δ1} which fulfil this equation
are referred to as candidate points.
Lemma 3. If x fulfils the maximum condition 0 < 1
wf(x) −γ(2f(x)− xσ2G(x))− |x|σ2 then
at the corresponding vector {eA, eB, δ1} both second order conditions are fulfilled.
We call the function that describes the border of the inequality given in Lemma 3,
|x|
σ2 =
1
wf(x) − γ(2f(x) − xσ2G(x)), the maximum condition function. We can plot the
candidate function and the maximum condition functions into one system as illustrated
in Figure 1.3. Both graphs depend on x which is given on the horizontal axis. The
candidate function is depicted by the blue curve and every point on it represents an
equilibrium in case the second order conditions are fulfilled for the same x-value. The
second order conditions are jointly represented by the maximum condition function
in red. In case this function has a positive value for a certain x both second order
conditions are fulfilled. Remember that x was initially defined as eA− eB + δ1. For this
reason we know that Player A has a higher winning probability for positive and Player
B for negative x, but we also know that Player B must have chosen a significantly
higher effort than A in case of a negative x-value and δ1 > 0. We can now read Figure
1.3 in a convenient way. The vertical axis is also a scale for δ1; hence we can choose
a particular initial unevenness δ1, take the corresponding x-value from the candidate
function and evaluate it using the maximum condition function. When it is positive at
that point, the combination of x, δ1 must be an equilibrium. Lemma 2 shows that with
the help of the first order conditions the unique pair of {eA, eB} can be retrieved.
3. Multiple Equilibria
In the following, we leave most technical details to the appendix but provide some
intuition verbally and graphically for why asymmetric equilibria exist. We will assume
throughout that δ1 > 0, i.e. Player A is ahead and benefits from the initial unevenness.10
10Due to the symmetry of the problem all results also apply in case Player B is ahead.
16 CHAPTER 1. CAN BEING BEHIND GET YOU AHEAD?
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5
x
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
candidate function
maximum condition function
Σ=1.5, Γ=0.99, w=5.5
Figure 1.3: maximum condition and candidate function with positive intersections
3.1 Confirming Asymmetric Equilibria
As explained earlier, introducing reference-dependence renders the middle ground, i.e.
when δ1+∆e is close to zero, unattractive to both players. Without reference-dependence
Player B and Player A would always choose the same level of effort since both players
have the same marginal costs and benefits are also the same due to the symmetry of the
normal distribution’s density. Therefore, the player ahead always maintains the same
advantage in the relative winning probability. An extra incentive rewarding more un-
equal winning probabilities like reference-dependent preferences, in this setting, would
just widen the already existing probability spread. To achieve this the player ahead
needs to put in relatively more effort than the player behind. Thus, when reference-
dependence increases the effective prize spread, both players will invest more effort, but
the player ahead claims a larger share of the extra contribution. In the following this
is referred to as Confirming Asymmetric Equilibrium.
Definition 1. Confirming Asymmetric Equilibrium (CAE)
A Confirming Asymmetric Equilibrium is an equilibrium where the advantaged player
spends more effort than the other player.
Figure 1.4 shows CAEs explicitly when Player A being initially advantaged. When
δ1 is positive, Player A ends up with a higher winning probability and the CAEs are
located in the upper right quadrant of the coordinate system. We see that each {x, δ1}
combination, for which the candidate function lies in this quadrant, is a CAE in case
the maximum condition function is positive for this x-value as well. In the depicted
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case there exists a CAE for all values of δ1. However, this does not need to be the
case.11 While there will always be candidate CAEs for all values of δ1, the maximum
condition is not necessarily fulfilled. We prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For δ1 large enough there always exists one Confirming Asymmetric
Equilibrium (CAE) that is a unique equilibrium.
For tournaments without reference-dependence, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that
symmetric equilibria do not necessarily exist and depend on the wage-schedule as well
as the degree of uncertainty inherent to the tournament.12 Proposition 1 shows that
strong unevenness at the start of the tournament curbs the first point. For sufficient
uncertainty, it eventually guarantees the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. While
equilibria in which a leading player extends the lead are not uncommon in the literature,
we now introduce two further types of equilibria.
3.2 Type One Turn Around Equilibria
Reference-dependence as described above introduces an incentive to “flee the middle”,
but this can be done in yet another way. As an alternative to the CAE the player
behind may decide to outspend the leading player. Such an equilibrium is called Turn
Around Equilibrium.
Definition 2. Turn Around Equilibrium (TAE)
A Turn Around Equilibrium is an equilibrium where the initially disadvantaged player
spends so much more effort that this player has higher probability to win the game than
the opposing player.
Definition 3. Type one Turn Around Equilibria (TAE1)
Type one Turn Around Equilibria (TAE1) are TAEs that exist over an interval for
{eA − eB + δ1} that is open and bounded above by 0.
Suppose that Player B is initially disadvantaged and considers investing more effort
than Player A. For Player A this could be an equilibrium since the player is willing
to settle at a point where the marginal benefits together with the marginal reduction
of the reference-dependence cost meets the marginal costs. The key to understanding
this intuition is to see that the incentive effect of reference-dependence changes sign at
x = δ1+∆e = 0. When Player A backs off, the incentive effect ∂R
A
∂x
= wγf(x)(2F (x)−1)
flips and the player will accept an equilibrium where the lower marginal benefit minus
the reference cost of increasing effort equals the marginal cost. This intuition is intact
as long as the unevenness is rather small and the wage level is high enough to motivate
Player B to overcome the initial disadvantage, but not so high as to make it intolerable
for Player A to back off.
11 It can happen, that the candidate function produces combinations of x and δ1 at which the
maximum condition function is still negative. In consequence CAEs are guaranteed for great x and
δ1, but given parameter values they may not exist for the whole range of δ1.
12Imagine there was no uncertainty in the tournament. Then, each player would try to marginally
overbid the opponent and no equilibrium in pure strategies would exist. Besides there would of course
exist a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
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This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2.
i) If w > 14γf(0)2 and w <
1
2γf(0)2 , a type one Turn Around Equilibrium (TAE1)
always exists.
ii) TAE1s are always interior.
The condition provided formulates a parameter range for the exogenous tournament
prize w and the reference-dependence variables γ = ηθ. Under the conditions of Propo-
sition 2 no symmetric equilibria exist.13
In case of an initial disadvantage for Player B, TAEs are defined as equilibrium
points where Player B spends sufficiently more effort than Player A to become the
favourite for winning the tournament. In consequence, TAEs for positive δ1 can be
found in the upper left quadrant of Figure 1.4. When δ1 > 0, as we assume through-
out without loss of generality, TAE1s are equilibria located in the negative x-domain
bordering zero. Depending on the parameter values of w and γ these equilibria exist
since the curvature of the candidate function is strong enough to reach into the positive
range of δ1 while the maximum condition function is still fulfilled for those x-values as
can be seen in Figure 1.4.14
The TAE1s that follow from Proposition 2 occur only for tight games and the
magnitude of the turn around is generally small. For illustration consider the example
where the tournament prize w = 5.5, chance has standard deviation of σ = 1.5, the
experience of losses is twice as strong as that of gains (θ = 1), and reference utility
is weighted equally strongly as consumption utility η = 1 such that γ = 1. Then, in
a game where Player A is ahead by 0.033 standard deviations initially, Player B can
overtake in equilibrium turning around a disadvantage of 0.06 standard deviations into
a lead of roughly 0.06 standard deviations. In terms of winning probabilities Player B
starts the tournament with a chance of winning of about 48.6 percent and ends it with
about 52.4 percent. So the leading player has a 3.8 percentage points lower probability
to win the game in the end. This is similar to the empirical evidence of Berger and
Pope (2011) who conduct an experiment where participants compete against each other
over two periods in a real effort task. They find that their subjects inserted most effort
in the second period when being told that they were slightly behind their opponent
and were more likely to win as a result. Berger and Pope (2011) also find a significant
increase of winning probability for basketball teams that are slightly behind before the
break compared to the leading team. Instead of having a lower probability to win, the
13This is also shown in Gill and Stone (2010).
14To verify that TAE1s are not only pathological cases, but appear over a range of x, we estimate
an interval of x values over wich TAE1s exist. For this we use a linear approximation of the maximum
condition function. Because of the convexity of the maximum condition function we can evaluate
a conservative estimation guarantees us TAE1 for x ∈
[
(wσγ−2σ3pi)√
2piw , 0
)
. The maximum condition
function is convex for the whole range of w used in this proposition. The proof is given in Lemma 5.
The boundaries for the set are derived in the proof of Proposition 2.
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team being behind by one point is more likely to win the game. In case of the NBA data
the trailing team has 1.1 percentage points higher probability to win the game than the
leading team. For the NCAA the result is even stronger: 5.6 percentage points. The
difference in winning probability at the breakpoint is significant. Naturally, this field
data result can have various explanations, one of which would be to describe it as a
TAE1 under the premises of this model.
3.3 Type Two Turn Around Equilibria
While the TAE1s described above are tight in the sense that the initially disadvantaged
player increases his winning probability only marginally above fifty percent, there can
also be TAEs where the lagging player outspends the opponent sufficiently to increase
the winning probability to much more than fifty percent.
Definition 4. Type two Turn Around Equilibria (TAE2)
Type two Turn Around Equilibria (TAE2) are TAEs that exist over intervals for {eA−
eB + δ1} that are bounded above by some xδ ≤ 0.
In this second class of TAEs the leading player backs off much to benefit from the fol-
lowing reference point reduction. This equilibrium may also exist for greater values of w,
which becomes apparent once we remember that the weight of the reference-dependence
effect, ∂RA
∂eA
= ηf(δ1 +∆e)w(θ(2F (δ1 +∆e)−1)), increases in w. The stronger impact of
reference-dependence makes it more important in the turn around case for the leading
player to reduce the effort and flee the middle. As a result, even for high w, TAE2s exist.
To construct the formal criterion we will use the point where the candidate func-
tion and the maximum condition function intersect. This point is given by xs =
(2f(xs)2wγ−1−2f(xs)2G(xs)w2γ)σ2
f(xs)w(1+G(xs)γ−σ2) . As x
s is exogenously determined by the parameters of
the model the conditions for w and γ provided in the proposition are exogenous as well.
Proposition 3.
i) When w ∈
(
1
4γf(0)2 ,
1
2γf(xs)2+B
)
where γ ∈
[
0.54,− 1
G(xs)
)
, σ sufficiently large and
B =
√
−γf(xs)2 2G(xs)(1+γG(xs))
σ2 ≥ 0 , a type two Turn Around Equilibrium (TAE2)
in which the agent behind spends much more effort than the agent ahead ex-
ists. The parameter xs determines the intersection between candidate function
and maximum condition function exogenously.
ii) If there exist TAE2s there also exist Confirming Asymmetric Equilibria (CAEs)
for small δ1.
iii) If the maximum condition function and the candidate function intersect but there
are no TAE2s also CAEs for small δ1 do not exist.
The conditions in Proposition 3 appear more complex than they are. Unlike Propo-
sition 2, Proposition 3 requires a minimum strength of reference-dependence γ. If this
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condition is not met, it is never optimal for the leading player to back off as much as
required in the TAE2. To illustrate this consider the following example: Suppose the
tournament prize is w = 10, chance again enters with a standard deviation of σ = 1.5,
experience of losses is twice as strong as that of gains (θ = 1) and reference utility
enters fully with η = 1 such that γ = 1. Then, TAE2 exist for any unevenness that
is smaller or equal to 0.07 standard deviations. From an initial probability of winning
of around 47.3 percent the lagging player in this equilibrium improves his chances to
87.8 percent. This will only be optimal for the player ahead if it is possible to benefit
sufficiently from lowering the reference point and hence γ must exceed a certain value.
The new condition for w has a similar spirit. While the lower bound coincides with
the one in Proposition 2, the upper bound is tightened by B ≥ 0 which added to the
denominator. Again, the reason is that for large tournament prizes it is never optimal
for the leading player to allow the other player to overtake. Imagine for example a
student who is competing with a class mate over relative grades in a course that is not
too important to both. After beating his mate in the midterms that student could still
decide not to prepare much for the final exam. He knows that he will probably not
come in first. Yet, that would not be too bad, because he also knows that it happened
because he was not really trying and could not expect to do any better given his effort.
The definition of TAE2s includes all TAE1s, but TAE2s are potentially located
further away from zero than TAE1s as illustrated in Figure 1.4. Due to the symme-
try properties of the candidate and maximum condition function they can be seen as
mirror images of certain CAEs. The maximum condition function is axis-symmetric
whereas the candidate function is point-symmetric. Consequently, any intersection of
the candidate function with the x-axes on the negative domain also exists in the posi-
tive domain and vice versa. For x-values larger than the positive root of the candidate
function there are CAEs while for x-values above the negative root there exist TAE2s
given that the maximum condition function to be positive. Due to axis-symmetry of
the maximum condition function it returns the same value at both outer roots of the
candidate function. Therefore, if the one equilibrium exist for small δ1 the other does
as well.15
3.4 Unique Turn Around Equilibria
The equilibria described spark questions about why the leading player may allow the
other player to overtake. One conceivable explanation would be that Turn Arounds
are somewhat “lazy equilibria” where the agent ahead has discovered that he greatly
benefits from lowering its reference point. However, such an intuition does not truly
capture the dynamics of the model. When there are three equilibria, TAE1s are the
equilibria with the highest total effort investment. Only for the CAE and TAE2s large
asymmetries are possible because one player benefits from lowering his reference point.
Moreover, we show that for certain parameter values where the CAEs do not exist a
TAE1 is the unique equilibrium.
15Because of continuity this is at least the case for an -ball around the root of the candidate function.
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Figure 1.4: maximum condition and candidate function with all equilibria
Proposition 4. When 14f(0)2γ < w <
1
2f(0)2γ and γ ≤ − f(x
s)2G(xs)pi2
2
σ2 +f(x
s)2pi(−2+G(xs)2pi) then for
small unevenness the unique equilibrium in pure strategies is a type one Turn Around
Equilibrium (TAE1), where xs exogenously determines the intersection between candi-
date function and maximum condition function.
The condition for w ensures that TAE1s exist, while the condition for γ rules out
the existence of TAE2s and even of CAEs for the particular interval of unevenness over
which TAE1s exist. This surprising result is made possible by the missing guarantee for
the existence of equilibria in Lazear and Rosen (1981) type tournaments. In a region
where the second order conditions do not allow CAEs to exist, the TAE1 candidate
point close to, but smaller than zero, satisfies them as illustrated in Figure 1.5.
Proposition 4 demonstrates that a TAE1 can be the only equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. While we do not engage in equilibrium selection, this shows that at least among
pure strategies there are situations where TAE1s must be played, as no other equilibria
exist. Thus, we show that it does not need differences in ability or imperfect informa-
tion to obtain the unambiguous prediction that a trailing player wins a tournament.
Having expectation based reference-dependent preferences can be sufficient for given
parameter constellations.
3.5 Catching Up Equilibria
At first glance the notion of Turn Around Equilibria maybe appears (too) strict. It
would have been possible to define TAEs as all asymmetric equilibria in which the ini-
tially disadvantaged player spends more effort than the advantaged player irrespective
of whether the difference is significant enough to turn the game. We call this broader
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Figure 1.5: maximum condition and candidate function with only TAE1
class of equilibria Catching Up Equilibria (CUE).
Definition 5. Catching Up Equilibrium (CUE)
A Catching Up Equilibrium is an equilibrium where the initially disadvantaged player
spends more effort than the opposing player.
From the definition it is apparent that every TAE must also be a CUE. However,
we show that the converse holds as well. Every equilibrium in which the player being
behind invests more effort than the opponent is also a TAE. In other words, situations
where trailing player catches up a little without turning the game do not exist.
Proposition 5. Every Catching Up Equilibrium is also a Turn Around Equilibrium.
For an intuition consider again the equilibrium in the model without reference-
dependence. Although one player is advantaged at the start of the tournament both
players pick the same effort. Compared to the trailing player in this set-up, a player
who tries to catch up, but not overtake, in the model with reference-dependent prefer-
ences faces greater marginal effort costs, larger marginal benefits16 and a more negative
marginal utility from reference comparison as the game becomes more even. If the
agent had favoured the greater marginal benefits over the marginal effort cost, it would
have chosen to insert more effort ex ante. Introducing an additional marginal cost in
the form of reference-dependence cannot motivate the agent to try catching up. Only
16 Since the probability density function of the normal distribution is single peaked at x = 0.
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when the sign of the marginal effect of reference-dependence changes, as it is the case
once one agent overtakes the other, this can be an equilibrium.
4. Conclusion
Which factors motivate players to invest in contest success is still a vibrant topic of
debate. While classical tournament theory as introduced by Lazear and Rosen (1981)
focuses on the higher probability of winning as benefit and the unpleasantness of effort
as a cost, a large recent literature indicates that players evaluate outcomes also along
certain reference points. Such reference-dependent preferences are an economically pow-
erful concept, as they can imply that an otherwise positive event causes negative utility
if the reference category was even more positive and vice versa. As a result, theoretical
predictions can change drastically once a model is augmented by reference-dependence.
In the context of tournaments, predicting a different winner could be considered such
a change.
We add to the work of Gill and Stone (2010), who focus on symmetric equilib-
ria when the half time score is even. For the large class of non even scores Gill and
Stone (2010) show that symmetric equilibria do not exist. We find that depending on
the strength of the reference-dependence, the tournament prize and the initial uneven-
ness three different classes of equilibria exist. In games where the initial unevenness
is strongly favourable for one party we find a unique equilibrium, in which the leading
player invests more effort than the player behind. However, when the game is tight and
the tournament prize is large enough to motivate the lagging player to overcome the
initial disadvantage, Turn Around Equilibria, where the player initially behind spends
much more effort than the player ahead and has a higher probability of winning the
tournament, always exist.
Our results can help to explain tournament outcomes that so far have been econom-
ically puzzling as presented by Berger and Pope (2011). Our results generate further
testable predictions. We find that for all equilibria where the player behind spends more
effort than the opponent, this player also has a greater chance of winning the tourna-
ment. Thus, we show that equilibria, in which the player behind merely catches up with
the leading player do not exist. Furthermore, we can show that under certain conditions
the TAE is the unique pure strategy equilibrium. While dynamic implications of this
framework were only touched upon, future research adding a further optimisation pe-
riod may provide interesting insights into how the anticipation of possible TAEs affects
agents’ incentives in an initial period.
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5. Appendix 1
In this appendix we prove all propositions and the lemmas stated in the main section.
The proofs will make use of additional lemmas which are proven within the proposition
where they are used first. Throughout we will assume without loss of generality that
δ1 > 0, which implies that Player A is at an advantage. However, due to the symmetry
of both players all results are also valid when δ1 < 0. All equilibria described assume
that a solution to the tournament exists. As described by Lazear and Rosen (1981) this
is always the case when precision of the random term given by 1
σ
is sufficiently small.17
The following proofs hold for σ2 ≥ 1.
Lemma 1. An equilibrium is interior if γ < | 1
G(x) |. Therefore all equilibria are interior
whenever γ ≤ 1.
Proof. This follows directly from the first order conditions. Using x = ∆e + δ and
γ = ηθ the first order conditions yield:
eA = wf(x)(1 + γG(x))
eB = wf(x)(1− γG(x))
Since wf(x) must be positive we will obtain interior solutions whenever (1+γG(x))
and (1− γG(x)) are also greater than zero. This implies that both conditions are ful-
filled whenever γ < | 1
G(x) |.
The term G(x) will never be 0 for any equilibrium with δ1 > 0:
Suppose: G(x) = 0 ⇒ 2F (x) − 1 = 0 ⇔ F (x) = 12 ⇔ 0 = x = δ1 + ∆e. From the first
order conditions we know that in case of x = 0 eA = eB = wf(0)⇒ ∆e = 0. This leads
to a contradiction with δ1 > 0.18
Since the function |G(x)| is bounded above by one and open there, a simple corollary
is that for γ ≤ 1 the condition is fulfilled and the corresponding equilibrium must be
interior.
Lemma 2. The system of first order conditions can be expressed as the candidate func-
tion δ1 = x − 2wγf(x)G(x). All combinations of {eA, eB, δ1} which fulfil this equation
are referred to as candidate points.
Proof. Using x = ∆e+ δ and γ = ηθ the first order conditions yield:
eA = wf(x)(1 + γ(2F (x)− 1))
eB = wf(x)(1− γ(2F (x)− 1))
Subtracting both equations and substituting G(x) = 2F (x)− 1 leads to:
eA − eB = 2wf(x)γG(x) (1.1)
17See Lazear and Rosen (1981) p.845 for more information.
18This also reveals that there cannot exist symmetric equilibria with initial unevenness.
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Since x− δ1 = eA − eB we can reformulate the above expression as:
δ1 = x− 2wf(x)γG(x)
The variable x describes an equilibrium uniquely whereas the exact corresponding effort
combination can be revealed by inserting x back into the first order conditions.
Lemma 3. If x fulfils the maximum condition 0 < 1
wf(x) −γ(2f(x)− xσ2G(x))− |x|σ2 then
at the corresponding vector {eA, eB, δ1} both second order conditions are fulfilled.
Proof. The second order conditions for a local maximum are given by:
wf ′(x)− wf ′(x)γ + 2γw
[
f ′(x)F (x) + f(x)2
]
− 1 < 0 (1.2)
wf ′(x)(−1)− wf ′(x)γ + 2γw
[
f ′(x)F (x) + f(x)2
]
− 1 < 0 (1.3)
We use the following property of the normal distribution:
f ′(x) = −x
σ2
f(x) (1.4)
By substituting (1.4) into (1.2) and (1.3) we can derive new inequalities which include
only the density and the distribution function of the normal distribution. Using that
G(x) = 2F (x)− 1 we can solve for:
wf(x)
{
2γf(x)− x
σ2
[1 + γG(x)]
}
− 1 < 0
wf(x)
{
2γf(x) + x
σ2
[1− γG(x)]
}
− 1 < 0
We will use the symmetry of the above two statements to condense their informa-
tional content into a single condition. Using a = 2γwf(x)2, b = w x
σ2f(x) and c = γG(x)
we can reformulate the statements to:
a− b(1 + c)− 1 < 0
a+ b(1− c)− 1 < 0
which can be rewritten as:
−b < 1− a+ bc
b < 1− a+ bc
It is now clear that both conditions must be fulfilled whenever |b| < 1−a+bc holds.
Substituting back we obtain 0 < 1
wf(x) − γ(2f(x)− xσ2G(x))− |x|σ2 .
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5.1 Proof of Proposition 1:
Proposition 1.
For δ1 large enough there always exists one Confirming Asymmetric Equilibrium
(CAE) that is a unique equilibrium.
Proof. We first showed in Lemma 2 that we can rewrite the system of first order con-
ditions to a simpler, but equivalent representation. Afterwards, using symmetry we
derived a single bound from the second order conditions which will be necessary and
sufficient to identify equilibria in Lemma 3.
We make use of the candidate function from Lemma 2 and the maximum condition
derived in Lemma 3.
0 < 1
wf(x) − γ(2f(x)−
x
σ2
G(x))− |x|
σ2
δ1 = x− 2wγf(x)G(x)
We know that f(x)G(x) → 0 for x → ∞ since f(x) → 0 and G(x) → 1. For this
reason letting δ1 go towards ∞ implies that x→∞.
As x > 0 we can simplify the maximum condition to:
1 < σ
2
f(x)wx −
σ2γ(2f(x)− x
σ2G(x))
x
The second term on the RHS will converge to the constant γ as x→∞. The first term
can be reformulated as
σ2
f(x)wx =
σ3
√
2pie
x2
2σ2
wx
Following L’Hôpital’s rule
σ
√
2pixe
x2
2σ2
w ∗ 1 →∞ ⇒
σ2
f(x)wx →∞
So the maximum condition will be fulfilled for sufficiently large δ1. It is not only unique
in the class of asymmetric equilibria but for all equilibria as symmetric equilibria cannot
exist for δ1 6= 0 (see Proposition 4 in Gill and Stone (2010)).
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2:
To prove Proposition 2 we first show that under certain conditions candidate points in
the sense of Lemma 2 exist that are potentially type one Turn Around Equilibria. We
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proceed by showing that the maximum condition function introduced in Lemma 3 is
strictly convex over some interval.
Lemma 4. For w > 14f(0)2γ , there always exist a positive δ1 such that its corresponding
extreme points include candidate Turn Around Equilibria (i.e. x < 0).
Proof. We show that under the condition TAE candidates (i.e. points where both
player’s First Order Conditions are fulfilled s.t. x < 0) exist for small positive values
of δ1. The inverse of the candidate function Lemma 2 would yield the equilibrium can-
didates for each value of δ1. Since it is not possible to express the inverse explicitly
we show that the function produces a small positive δ1(x) when given a small negative
value for x as an argument. Note that for x < 0 the function G(x) < 0 as well.
δ1(x) = x− 2wγf(x)G(x) (1.5)
The derivative of this function with respect to x yields:
∂δ1(x)
∂x
= 1− 4wγf(x)2 + x
σ2
2wγf(x)G(x)
When x = 0 and w = 14f(0)2γ the above expression equals zero and is negative for any
w larger than 14f(0)2γ . Given this negative slope at x = 0 the function must be positive
for some small negative x.
Lemma 5. The maximum condition function 1
wf(x) − γ(2f(x)− xG(x))− |x|σ2 is strictly
convex for all w ∈
[
1
4f(0)2γ ,
1
f(0)2γ
]
.
Proof. The maximum condition 0 < 1
wf(x) − γ(2f(x)− xσ2G(x)) + xσ2 for x < 0 is convex
if the second derivative is positive:
σ2 + x2
2f(x)2wσ2 +
(
3− 2x
2
σ2
)
γ > 0 (1.6)
To find the prize w for which this condition is always fulfilled we substitute w =
1
f(0)2γ∗a and obtain
af(0)2
2f(x)2σ2 (σ
2 + x2) + (3− 2x2
σ2 ) > 0. Solving as an equality for a yields
a = 4x
2 − 6σ2
f(0)2
f(x)2 (σ2 + x2)
(1.7)
We then find the maximum value for 1.7 using the following first order condition,
8σ2 + x2 − 2x
4
σ2
= 0
which is fulfilled whenever xmax = −12σ
√
1 +
√
65.19 Then, at the maximum σ drops
out and we obtain a(xmax) = (9 −
√
65)e−0.25(1+
√
65) ≈ 0.97. Consequently the second
order condition must be fulfilled when w < 1
f(0)2γ .
19The Second Order Condition at xmax is negative and yields (7
√
65−65)8e−0.25(1+
√
65)
5σ2 ≈ −1.42σ2 .
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Proposition 2.
i) If w > 14γf(0)2 and w <
1
2γf(0)2 , a type one Turn Around Equilibrium (TAE1)
always exists.
ii) TAE1s are always interior.
Proof. We showed in Lemma 4 that for certain values of w extreme point couples (for
values of {eA, eB, δ1}) exist that could be type one Turn Around Equilibria (TAE1).
Lemma 5 gives us the convexity of the maximum condition for certain values of w.
We will execute the proof of part i) by using Lemma 4 and by showing that given
w < 12γf(0)2 the maximum condition derived in Lemma 3 is fulfilled. From Lemma 3 we
know that both second order conditions will be fulfilled whenever
0 < 1
wf(x) − γ(2f(x)−
x
σ2
G(x))− |x|
σ2
(1.8)
Since w < 12γf(0)2 we know that
2γf(0)2
f(x) − γ(2f(x)−
x
σ2
G(x))− |x|
σ2
<
1
wf(x) − γ(2f(x)−
x
σ2
G(x))− |x|
σ2
Now suppose x = 0. We obtain:
2γf(0)− 2γf(0) + 0− 0 = 0 < 1
wf(0) − 2γf(0)
Therefore we know that for all w < 12γf(0)2 the maximum condition function
1
wf(x) −
γ(2f(x) − x
σ2G(x)) − |x|σ2 will take up a value greater than zero when x = 0. Then, it
follows by the continuity of the maximum condition function that for any such w there
exist some  close to zero such that 0 < 1
wf() − γ(2f()− σ2G())− ||σ2 .
To obtain a conservative estimate of an interval in which the TAE1s lie, we use the
strict convexity of the maximum condition function shown in Lemma 5. Now we can
derive the first order Taylor approximation around x = 0 for x ≤ 0 which yields:
T1(0) =
(
σ
√
2pi
w
− 1
σ
√
2pi
γ
)
+ x
σ2
Given the positive slope and the convexity of the maximum condition function we know,
that the intersection of the approximation with the abscissa will provide a conservative
lower bound for the interval. The resulting interval of x-values in which TAE1s exist
can be expressed as: [
(wσγ − 2σ3pi)√
2piw
, 0
)
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As G(x)→ 0 for x→ 0 all TAE1s close to zero are interior as stated in part ii).
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3:
To prove Proposition 3 we first show in Lemma 6 that there is only one convex interval
for x over which candidate TAEs exist. We continue by showing in Lemma 7 that the
candidate function and the maximum condition function have an intersection where
δ1 > 0 or the maximum condition is always fulfilled. Then, we show in Lemma 8 that
the maximum condition function cannot intersect the horizontal axis more than twice.
Lastly, we establish in Lemma 9 that the maximum condition function may not have
these two roots over an interval over which it is strictly greater than the candidate
function.
Definition 6. Intersection in positive/negative range
We say that two function intersect in positive/negative range, when they return a posi-
tive/negative value at that intersection.
Lemma 6. For w > 14f(0)2γ , the candidate function δ1(x) = x − 2wγf(x)G(x) has
exactly one maximum on the domain x ∈ (−∞, 0). At this maximum the candidate
function is positive. There exists some x∗ < 0 such that δ1(x∗) = 0.
Proof. We know from Lemma 4 that when w > 14f(0)2γ Turn Around candidates with
x < 0 and δ1(x) > 0 exist for some x close to zero. Moreover, it is easy to see that
δ1(x) → −∞ when x → −∞ and that δ1(0) = 0. Since the candidate function is
continuous there must be at least one maximum point for negative x. In the following
we will show that there is only one. Consider the first and second derivative of the
candidate function:
∂δ1(x)
∂x
= 1 + 2wγxf(x)G(x)
σ2
− 4wγf(x)2 (1.9)
∂δ1(x)2
∂2x
= 8xγwf(x)
2
σ2
+ 2wγf(x)
σ2
(G(x) + x(2f(x)− xG(x)
σ2
)) (1.10)
Note that |G(x)| < 0 for x < 0 so that (1.10) is strictly negative and hence the first
derivative is monotonously decreasing as long as G(x)x
σ2 ≤ 2f(x). This is fulfilled as long
as 2f(x)σ2
G(x) ≤ x and x < 0. Inserting the boundary case x = 2f(x)σ
2
G(x) in (1.9) simplifies it
to:
1− 2wγ(−2f(x)2 + 2f(x)2) = 1 > 0
However when x = 0 equation (1.9) is smaller than zero if w > 14f(0)2γ . Thus the
first derivative of the candidate function is below zero for x = 0 and greater than zero
when x = 2f(x)σ2
G(x) and it is monotonously decreasing over the interval [
2f(x)σ2
G(x) , 0). Thus,
the first derivative intersects the abscissa exactly once over that interval. Furthermore,
when x < 2f(x)σ2
G(x) condition (1.9) is always positive and therefore does not have another
root for negative x.
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Lemma 7. When w ∈
 1
4γf(0)2 ,
1
γf(xs)2+
√
γf(xs)2(γf(xs)2− 2G(xs)(1+γG(xs))
σ2 )
,
γ ∈
[
0.54,− 1
G(xs)
)
and σ large enough
• either the maximum condition function and the candidate function intersect and
do so for x < 0 when δ1 > 0 only
• or in case of no intersection the maximum condition is fulfilled for all x where the
candidate function has positive values.
Proof. To derive the conditions for when the intersection is within positive range (as il-
lustrated in Figure 1.3) we begin by setting both functions equal. The intersection point
is endogenously described by a value for x that is xs = (2f(xs)2wγ−1−2f(xs)2G(xs)w2γ)σ2
f(xs)w(1+G(xs)γ−σ2)
and is used as an argument for the maximum condition which, then, yields 0 <
−2f(xs)2wγ(G(xs)w+G(xs)2wγ−σ2)+σ2
f(xs)w(1+G(xs)γ−σ2) . Using σ
2 ≥ 1 we can derive the following condition.
The latter expression is larger than zero whenever either of the following hold:
w <
1
γf(xs)2 −
√
γf(xs)2(γf(xs)2 − 2G(xs)(1+γG(xs))
σ2 )
(1.11)
w <
1
γf(xs)2 +
√
γf(xs)2(γf(xs)2 − 2G(xs)(1+γG(xs))
σ2 )
(1.12)
To ensure that the equilibrium is interior we assume γ < − 1
G(x) . When γ < − 1G(x) ,
(1.11) is always negative and is therefore neglected. Instead we employ (1.12) as an
upper bound. To ensure that the lower bound w > 14γf(0)2 is below (1.12) another
restriction for γ is required which is obtained by solving the following for γ:
1
4γf(0)2 <
1
γf(xs)2 +
√
γf(xs)2(γf(xs)2 − 2G(xs)(1+γG(xs))
σ2
This can be rearranged as condition for γ:
γ > − f(x
s)2G(xs)pi2
2
σ2 + f(xs)2pi(−2 +G(xs)2pi)
(1.13)
This expression appears to be complicated and restrictive. However, it can be sim-
plified at little cost in terms of accuracy. Using that G(x) < 0 for negative x and that
f(x)2 < 12piσ2 , one can quickly see that the denominator will always be larger than one.
The numerator contains G(x) which equals 2F (x) − 1 = Erf( x√2σ ) = 2√pi
∫ x√2σ
0 e
−t2dt.
It must hold that the actual area underneath the integrated function is smaller than
the area of the rectangle formed by the global maximum of the function over the x-
interval. The largest value e−t2 may assume is one. Thus, it holds for negative x
that −G(x) = −Erf( x√2σ ) ≤ − 2√2piσx ∗ 1. For the entire numerator this implies that
−f(x)2G(x)pi2 ≤ −
√
pi√
2σxe
− x2
σ2 , the maximum of which is at x = − σ√2 . Hence, the nu-
merator will not exceed
√
pi√
4 e
− 12 ≈ 0.53 and whenever γ ≥ 0.54, condition (1.13) will also
5. APPENDIX 1 31
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5
x
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
candidate function
maximum condition function
Σ=1.5, Γ=0.85, w=4.6
Figure 1.6: maximum condition and candidate function having no intersection points
in the negative domain
be satisfied. When both conditions are fulfilled any intersection between the maximum
condition and the candidate function occurs in positive range.
Suppose no intersection between the candidate function and the maximum condition
function and hence no xs exists (as illustrated in Figure 1.6). For sufficiently small x
we know that the maximum condition function is always positive while the candidate
function is strictly negative. Without an intersection the continuity of both functions
implies that the maximum condition function lies above the candidate function for all
x < 0. However, when w > 14f(0)2γ it is known from Lemma 4 that there are always
values for x < 0 where the candidate function is positive. Since the maximum condition
function must return greater values than the candidate function it also must be positive.
Lemma 8. The maximum condition function has no more than two roots when x < 0
and w < 12f(x)2γ .
Proof. Setting the maximum condition function equal to zero and solving for x yields
xR = σ2(2wγf(x)2−1)
wf(x)(1+γG(x)) = x
R(x). This equation must be fullfilled for every root of the max-
imum condition function. We show that the maximum condition function has at most
two roots by showing that this equation has at most two solutions for x < 0. For this
we demonstrate in the remainder of the proof that the function xR(x) = σ2(2wγf(x)2−1)
wf(x)(1+γG(x))
is strictly concave and can, thus, have at most one maximum. To understand why this
implies the statement in the lemma, consider the following: We want to know for how
many x the equation xR = xR(x) can be fulfilled. We also know that xR (the left-hand-
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side of the equation) is a straight line with slope one. If we now knew that xR(x) was
strictly concave, we would know that it cannot intersect the straight line xR more than
twice (and hence that the maximum condition function may not have more than two
roots). Thus, in the remainder of the proof we show that the second derivative of xR(x)
ist strictly smaller than zero for x < 0. The second derivative of xR(x) is given by:20
∂xR(x)2
∂2x
=8γ
2σ2f(x)(2wγf(x)2 − 1) + 2xγ(1 + γG(x))(6wγf(x)2 + 1)
w(1 + γG(x))3
−
( 1
f(x)(1 + 2wγf(x)
2) + x2
σ2f(x)(1− 2wγf(x)2))
w(1 + γG(x)) < 0
We now show that the term above is strictly negative. For this it suffices to look
at the numerator of both fractions as the denominators are strictly positive under the
assumption of Lemma 1 that γ < | 1
G(x) |. The numerator of the first fraction is a sum
of two elements. The first element must be negative, since (2wγf(x)2 − 1) < 0 when
w < 12f(x)2γ . The second element is all positive except for the x which is taken to be
smaller than zero. Thus, we know that the first fraction is negative. The second frac-
tion, which gets substracted, is positive. It is also composed of two elements, the first
of which is unambiguously positive while the second is positive as long as w < 12f(x)2γ .
In consequence, the second derivative of xR(x) is strictly smaller than zero.
Therefore, the equation xR(x) = σ2(2wγf(xR)2−1)
wf(xR)(1+γG(xR)) has at most two solutions and the
maximum condition function has at most two roots.
Lemma 9. The maximum condition function cannot have two roots within an interval
over which it is strictly larger than the candidate function for w < 12f(x)2γ .
Proof. Consider again the root of the maximum condition function as given by xR(x) =
σ2(2wγf(xR)2−1)
wf(xR)(1+γG(xR)) . We will show that its first derivative is strictly positive if the maximum
condition function lies above the candidate function. The latter is true whenever:
1
wf(x) − γ
(
2f(x)− x
σ2
G(x)
)
+ x
σ2
> x− 2wγf(x)G(x)
which can be rewritten as an upper bound for w:
w <
σ2
f(x)2γσ2 − f(x)x((1+G(x)γ)−σ2)2 +
√
f(x)2(−8G(x)γσ4+(x+G(x)xγ−(x+2f(x)γ)σ2)2)
2
= w˜
(1.14)
Now consider the first derivative of the root function xR(x):
∂xR(x)
∂x
=
−x(1 + γG(x))(2wf(x)γ + 1
f(x))− 4wσ2γ2f(x)2 + 2γσ2
w(1 + γG(x))2 (1.15)
20The first derivative is given by ∂x
R(x)
∂x =
−x(1+γG(x))(2wf(x)γ+ 1
f(x) )−4wσ2γ2f(x)2+2γσ2
w(1+γG(x))2
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As the denominator is positive it remains to show that the numerator is strictly
positive. We start by rewriting the term to the following inequality:
σ2(1− 2wγf(x)2)− x2f(x)γ (1 + γG(x))− wxf(x)(1 + γG(x)) > 0 (1.16)
The last two subtrahends of the numerator are negative for all x < 0 whereas the first
summand is positive in case w < 12γf(x)2 . Thus, if condition (1.14) implies w <
1
2γf(x)2 ,
the lemma must be true. Consequently, we verify in the following that w < 12γf(x)2
holds if the maximum condition function is bigger than the candidate function.
We begin by considering the large term under the root in the denominator of w˜ in
condition (1.14):√
f(x)2(−8G(x)γσ4 + (x+G(x)xγ − (x+ 2f(x)γ)σ2)2) =
√
f(x)2(4f(x)2γ2σ4 + x2((1 + γG(x))− σ2)2 + C)
Firstly, we show that the term C = −8G(x)γσ4 − 4f(x)γσ2x((1 + G(x)γ) − σ2) is
positive.
0 < −4(2G(x)γσ4 + f(x)γσ2x((1 +G(x)γ)− σ2))
⇔ 0 < −4γσ2(σ2(2G(x)− f(x)x) + f(x)x(1 + γG(x)))
⇔ 0 > σ2(2G(x)− f(x)x) + f(x)x(1 + γG(x))
It is easy to verify that (2G(x) − f(x)x) is strictly negative21 for all x < 0. Since the
term (1+γG(x)) is positive by the assumptions on γ, the statement above must be true
and C is indeed positive. Having established that C is positive we can now overestimate
w˜ by dropping C. Thus,
w˜ <
1
f(x)2γσ2 − f(x)x((1+G(x)γ)−σ2)2 +
√
f(x)2[x((1+G(x)γ)−σ2)+2f(x)γσ2]2
2
which can be simplified to:
w˜ <
1
f(x)2γσ2 − f(x)x((1+G(x)γ)−σ2)2 + 2f(x)
2γσ2+f(x)x((1+G(x)γ)−σ2)
2
= 12f(x)2γσ2
Hence, w˜ < 12γf(x)2 is true as well. Consequently, (1.16) holds for all x < 0 where the
maximum condition function lies above the candidate function.
Proposition 3.
i) When w ∈
(
1
4γf(0)2 ,
1
2γf(xs)2+B
)
where γ ∈
[
0.54,− 1
G(xs)
)
, σ sufficiently large and
B =
√
−γf(xs)2 2G(xs)(1+γG(xs))
σ2 ≥ 0 , a type two Turn Around Equilibrium (TAE2)
21Its derivative f(x)(3 + x2σ2 ) is strictly positive. Moreover it is zero when x = 0 and approaches −2
when x→ −∞.
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in which the agent behind spends much more effort than the agent ahead ex-
ists. The parameter xs determines the intersection between candidate function
and maximum condition function exogenously.
ii) If there exist TAE2s there also exist Confirming Asymmetric Equilibria (CAEs)
for small δ1.
iii) If the maximum condition function and the candidate function intersect, but there
are no TAE2s, also no CAEs for small δ1 exist.
Proof. i) To establish the existence of TAE2s, i.e. TAEs over an x-interval which is not
necessarily adjacent to zero, one needs to show that over such an interval and under
some conditions both the candidate function and maximum condition function return
positive values. In Lemma 6 it was established that the candidate function has exactly
one maximum and no other extreme points over the domain of strictly negative x. We
also know from Lemma 4 that when w > 14γf(0)2 the candidate function always returns
positive values over the interval given by the roots of candidate function (x∗, 0) where
x∗ = 2wγf(x∗)G(x∗). Lemma 7 implies that when candidate and maximum condition
function do not intersect for x < 0 the maximum condition derived in Lemma 3 is
fulfilled for all x where the candidate function is positive. Especially at the left root
of the candidate function this leads to TAE2s that are rather ’far away’ from x = 0.
Additionally, given its conditions Lemma 7 implies that if intersections between the
candidate and the maximum condition function exist for some x < 0, then both the
maximum condition and the candidate function are positive at the intersection as illus-
trated in figure 1.4. It follows that around this intersection TAE2s exist.
Before we continue with part ii) we show that Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 also hold
for the upper bound of w given in Proposition 3. We will proceed with the proof for
the general case using x so it will also hold for a specific xs. We want to show that
1
2f(x)2γ >
1
2f(x)2γ+B which holds if B is strictly positive. If this holds the upper bound
used in Proposition 3 is always smaller than the one used in Lemma 8 and Lemma 9
meaning they also hold for this proposition. First we show that the upper bound for
w given in Proposition 3 is tighter than the upper bound of Lemma 7. The latter’s
denominator can be reformulated as follows:
γf(x)2 +
√
γf(x)2(γf(x)2 − 2G(x)(1 + γG(x))
σ2
)
= γf(x)2 +
√
γ2f(x)4 − 2γf(x)
2G(x)(1 +G(x)γ)
σ2
= γf(x)2 +
√
γ2f(x)4 − A
≤ 2γf(x)2 +√−A = 2γf(x)2 +B
This last step was established by using Jensen’s inequality. Since the numerators of both
upper bounds are equal this step shows that the upper bound given in Proposition 3 is
tighter than that of Lemma 7. Solving for B leads to:
B ≥ −γf(x)2 +
√
γ2f(x)4 − A > 0
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This holds as A is negative for γ ≤ | 1
G(x) |.
Since B > 0 it must be that 12f(x)2γ >
1
2f(x)2γ+B . This also holds for the case x = x
s.
ii) To study the relationship between strong TAEs and CAEs for small δ1 we make
use of the symmetry property of the candidate function δ1(x) as well as the maximum
condition function maxcond(x):
δ1(x) = −δ1(−x)
maxcond(x) = maxcond(−x)
Having CAEs means that δ1(x) > 0 for x > 0 and the maxcond(x) > 0. Using the
symmetry this is equivalent to δ1(−x) < 0 while maxcond(−x) < 0.
From Lemma 6 we know that the candidate function has only one maximum on
the negative domain and in Proposition 1 we derived that the candidate function ap-
proaches infinity if x→∞. By symmetry this implies that the candidate function goes
towards minus infinity if x → −∞. Since δ1(0) = 0 it follows from continuity that
candidate CAEs (not necessarily CAEs) exist for all values of δ1.
To find CAEs we have to insure that the maximum condition is fulfilled. We use
the previously derived lemmas to make a statement about the maximum condition for
all x < xδ, where xδ is the negative root of the candidate function, and, then, use the
symmetry properties from above to apply it to the candidate CAEs. We know that the
maximum condition as derived in Lemma 3 goes to infinity when x → −∞ and since
we have shown the existence of TAE2s in part i) there also exist some x < 0 where
maximum condition and candidate function are both positive.
In consequence for the maximum condition to become negative over x < 0 it has to
have at least two roots on the same domain. Moreover, we know from Lemma 8 that
the maximum condition function cannot not have more than 2 roots for x < 0.
One possibility would be that the maximum condition function could have one root
below xδ and one above. In this case there would be a negative intersection of the
maximum condition function with the candidate function as the candidate function
must be negative for x < 2wγf(x)G(x) by Lemma 4. Since our conditions for TAE2s
ensure that all intersection points are positive for x < 0 this case can be excluded.
Secondly, the roots of the maximum condition function could both be below xδ. This,
however, directly contradicts Lemma 9 as the maximum condition has to be bigger
than the candidate function at xδ. Otherwise this would be equivalent to the previous
example. Using symmetry this implies the existence of CAEs for small δ1.
Lastly we address part iii). Following the same argument we know that in cases
where no TAE2s exist, but the candidate and maximum condition functions still inter-
sect, the intersection point must lie in negative range. Since the candidate function is
negative for sufficiently small x, we know from Lemma 6 that the candidate function
will not have an intersection with the abscissa for x < 0. This implies, that, because of
the symmetry property of the candidate function, CAEs for small δ1 do also not exist.
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5.4 Proof of Proposition 4:
Proposition 4. When 14f(0)2γ < w <
1
2f(0)2γ and γ ≤ − f(x
s)2G(xs)pi2
2
σ2 +f(x
s)2pi(−2+G(xs)2pi) then for
small unevenness the unique equilibrium in pure strategies is a type one Turn Around
Equilibrium (TAE1), where xs exogenously determines the intersection between candi-
date function and maximum condition function.
Proof. We know from Proposition 3 and Lemma 7 that TAE2s only exist when:
γ > − f(x
s)2G(xs)pi2
2
σ2 + f(xs)2pi(−2 +G(xs)2pi)
(1.17)
Moreover, we know from Proposition 3 that for δ1 small enough CAEs only exist if
TAE2s exist as well. TAE1s as described in Proposition 2 on the other hand, always
exist when
1
4f(0)2γ < w <
1
2f(0)2γ
Since the lower bound for γ (1.17) is strictly positive and lower and upper bound
for w cannot intersect, we know that when the condition for γ is not satisfied there is
yet a prize level w for which a TAE1 exists and is the only equilibrium for small enough
δ1.
5.5 Proof of Proposition 5:
Proposition 5. Every Catching Up Equilibrium (CUE) is also a Turn Around Equi-
librium (TAE).
Proof. Remember that x was defined as x = ∆e + δ1. Suppose again without loss of
generality that player 1 is initially ahead, i.e. δ1 > 0, and that at the CUE player 2
spends more effort than player 1 with ∆e < 0, but not enough to turn the game, i.e.
∆e+ δ1 > 0. From Lemma 2 we know that the candidate function provides all possible
equilibrium candidate points:
δ1(x) = x− 2f(x)wγG(x)
To find a CUE that is no TAE we need to show that there exist candidate points
where for x > 0 and ∆e = x− δ1 < 0. We show that this can never be the case:
x− δ1 = 2f(x)wγG(x)
For x > 0 the RHS cannot be negative since G(x) is positive for all x > 0 and the
other terms are always positive. So x− δ1 will be positive for all x > 0.
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6. Appendix 2 – Technicalities
We provide these pages as an additional aid for the verification of some expressions.
6.1 Derivation of (1.11) and (1.12) in Lemma 7
We want to find a condition for w that ensures that the intesection between the candi-
date and the maximum condition function occurs in positive range. We show in Lemma
7 that this must be the case when:
0 < −2f(x
s)2wγ(G(xs)w +G(xs)2wγw − σ2) + σ2
f(xs)w(1 +G(xs)γ − σ2)
Note that as G(xs)γ < 0 and σ2 ≥ 1 the denominator is smaller zero. Collecting
the w terms and multiplying with the negative denominator yields:
0 > w2(−2f(xs)2γG(xs)(1 +G(xs)γ)) + 2f(xs)2wγσ2 − σ2
Next, we solve the above inequality as a quadratic equation for w. This gives:
w =
σ2(2γf(xs)2 ±
√
f(xs)2γ(f(xs)2γ − 2G(xs)(1+γG(xs))
σ2 )
2f(xs)2γG(xs)(1 + γG(xs)) =
σ2(A±√B)
C
We now get to (1.11) and (1.12) by recognising that C = σ2(A +
√
B)(A − √B).
Thus
w = σ
2(A±√B)
σ2(A+
√
B)(A−√B) =
1
(A−√B) or
1
(A+
√
B)
The first possible solution is equivalent to (1.11), the second to (1.12) in Lemma 7.
6.2 Derivation of (1.13) in Lemma 7
We want to derive the lower bound for γ given in (1.13). Starting with the inequality
1
4γf(0)2 =
piσ2
2γ <
1
γf(xs)2 +
√
γf(xs)2(γf(xs)2 − 2G(xs)(1+γG(xs))
σ2 )
first rearranging leads to
γf(xs)2 +
√
γf(xs)2(γf(xs)2 − 2G(x
s)(1 + γG(xs))
σ2
) < 2γ
piσ2
Suqaring the next rearrangement√
γf(xs)2(γf(xs)2 − 2G(x
s)(1 + γG(xs))
σ2
) < 2γ
piσ2
− γf(xs)2
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gives us
γf(xs)2(γf(xs)2 − 2G(x
s)(1 + γG(xs))
σ2
) < γ2( 2
piσ2
− f(xs)2)2
⇔ f(xs)4 − 2G(x
s)f(xs)2
σ2γ
− 2f(x
s)2G(xs)2
σ2
< ( 2
piσ2
− f(xs)2)2
⇔ −2G(x
s)f(xs)2
σ2γ
< ( 2
piσ2
− f(xs)2)2 − f(xs)4 + 2G(x
s)f(xs)2
σ2γ
In the next step, we need to solve for γ.
2G(xs)f(xs)2
σ2(( 2
piσ2 − f(xs)2)2 − f(xs)4 + 2f(x
s)2G(xs)2
σ2 )
< γ
Simplifying the the LHS reveals (1.13).
− 2G(x
s)f(xs)2
σ2( 4
pi2σ4 − 4f(x
s)4
piσ2 + f(xs)4 − f(xs)4 + 2f(x
s)2G(xs)2
σ2 )
=
− f(x
s)2G(xs)pi2
2
σ2 + f(xs)2pi(−2 +G(xs)2pi)
< γ
6.3 Derivation of (1.14) in Lemma 9
1
wf(x) − γ
(
2f(x)− x
σ2
G(x)
)
+ x
σ2
> x− 2wγf(x)G(x)
can be rewritten as:
w <
σ2
f(x)2γσ2 − f(x)x((1+G(x)γ)−σ2)2 +
√
f(x)2(−8G(x)γσ4+(x+G(x)xγ−(x+2f(x)γ)σ2)2)
2
= w˜.
We begin by bringing all terms to the left side and multiplying by wf(x):
w22γf(x)2G(x) + wf(x)(x( 1
σ2
− 1)− γ(2f(x)− x
σ2
G(x))) + 1 > 0
Collecting all x together and multiplying by σ2 we obtain:
w22γf(x)2G(x)σ2 + wf(x)(x((1 + γG(x))− σ2)− 2γf(x)σ2) + σ2 > 0
To solve for w we now use the quadratic formula for the equality w = −b±
√
b2−4ac
2a where
a = 2γf(x)2G(x)σ2, b = f(x)(x((1 + γG(x)) − σ2) − 2γf(x)σ2) and c = σ2. Plugging
in a, b and c yields:
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w =f(x)(x(σ
2 − (1 + γG(x))) + 2γf(x)σ2)
4γσ2f(x)2G(x)
±
√
(f(x)(x((1 + γG(x))− σ2)− 2γf(x)σ2))2 − 8γσ4f(x)2G(x)
4γσ2f(x)2G(x)
To deal with this big term we now temporarily express it as s−
√
t
4γσ2f(x)2G(x) . We neglect
the postive root, as we are looking for a conservative upper bound. The crucial step to
obain (1.14) is to realise that the denominator 4γσ2f(x)2G(x) can be rewritten as s2−t2σ2 ,
which we now show:
s2 − t =(f(x)(x((1 + γG(x))− σ2)− 2γf(x)σ2))2
− (f(x)(x((1 + γG(x))− σ2)− 2γf(x)σ2))2 + 8γσ4f(x)2G(x)
=8γσ4f(x)2G(x)
Thus s2−t2σ2 = 4γσ
2f(x)2G(x). We can now say 2σ2(s−
√
t)
s2−t =
2σ2(s−√t)
(s−√t)(s+√t) =
2σ2
s+
√
t
which
is equal to:
σ2
f(x)2γσ2 − f(x)x((1+G(x)γ)−σ2)2 +
√
f(x)2(−8G(x)γσ4+(x+G(x)xγ−(x+2f(x)γ)σ2)2)
2
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Chapter 2
Competing Firms on New Media
In this chapter, I model a reviewing process on new media as contest situa-
tion between two firms. The complexity of the model increases when taking
the risk of losing potential buyers into account and when considering that
hosts of blogs and video channels might evaluate using objective as well as
subjective criteria. It can be seen, that especially unknown firms with low
costs which produce decent quality products which are not that pricy have
an incentive to participate in such contests, using it as inexpensive adver-
tisement to win new customers. By contrast, firms with high market share
that might be often forced into these contests due to their popularity are
compelled to rise their quality. To gain further insights, a one stage Tullock
contest with the two decisive variables quality and taste is developed and
analyzed. As a result, an evaluation including quality and taste at the same
time is most likely to increase the consumer’s utility. Furthermore, it can
be shown that the second variable is more likely to be used by the weaker
opponent.
1. Introduction
In 2001 the company “Blogger” started to provide a platform for people to publish
their own journals online for the first time.1 A few years later the first youtube video
went online in 2005.2 Nowadays, many people write blogs - private blogs about topics
like traveling or commercial blogs about their business. Most people are online every
day and use the internet as an additional source for information and entertainment
next to television, radio or print. Youtube has become a ginormous platform and
community where people publish their channels and follow other hosts for entertainment
and information. Another modern way of being entertained and informed is listening
to podcasts. These broadcasts have been made accessible for the mass in 2005 by apple
implementing a podcast service into their music application iTunes.3 All these media
channels were intended for privat use at first and were discovered by companies as
important way to address a different class of customers later on.
1For further information see Baker (2009).
2This is the first youtube video posted by one of the founders: Karim (2005).
3Further information can be found e.g. in this article BBCNews (2005).
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To promote launches of new products or product lines, companies might sent sam-
ples to known blogs of a fitting topic. E.g. the beauty company Sally Hansen sent her
new nail polish collection to one of the biggest German beauty blogs Grüttner (2016)
to promote the introduction of their products in the drug store “dm” in Germany. The
blogger was able to test the products and wrote a review about the experience men-
tioning the upcoming introduction in the stores. However, blogger do not only review
products separately but they explicitly look for similarities between comparable prod-
ucts. E.g. beauty bloggers look for cheaper duplicates of hyped highly priced products
called “dupes” like in the show by Kusak and Engelshowe (2015) called “beautea time”
where a limited edition from a drugstore label, that has bean provided by the brand and
is reviewed with focus on possible “dupes”. Especially, bloggers or hosts in general are a
good source of information concerning comparisons between products as they have a lot
of experience in their field and have seen or tried many products. For this reason they
often relate to other products during a review and compare them. To have a product
being revied or compared to other products by a host it is beneficial for a company
to provide the product to the host even if it is costly. In his report, Olhoeft (2016)
explains, why a sponsored mobile phone should not be seen as bribe as you usually do
not take it and sell it on eBay, for example, but it is needed to compare it to other
mobile phones with comparable specifications. E.g. the brand Huawei wants to reach
a status on the same level with apple and samsung in the mobile phone market. For
this reason, they do not only organize big key notes to signal their importance but they
also provide their phones to the tech bloggers and channel owners invited to become
part of the comparison.
Hence, firms can use new media like blogs, video channels or podcasts as possibilities
for advertising and winning new customers. Hosts have alternative ways to evaluate
products as they do not claim to be objective but the characteristic about their format
is their personal opinion and their experience. Furthermore, it is possible for firms to
enter this reviewing process on their own by providing their product to the hosts as
mentioned above. The recommendations of the hosts can be assumed to motivate some
of their viewers, readers or listeners to follow their advice and buy the product favored
in the article or episode.
In this chapter, I capture the main characteristics of these reviewing processes with
comparison component in order to formalize this new way of evaluation process and
analyses influences on the product specifications. The focus is set on the optimal be-
havior of firms in this context but it will be payed attention to the factors that motivate
a firm to voluntarily enter this contest situation as well. Furthermore, possible benefits
and drawbacks for consumers and firms resulting from this new way of competing for
customers will be discussed. I focus on the way the host can evaluate the products in
objective as well as subjective ways, by first developing a one dimensional model taking
into account either the objective or the subjective approach and finally combining both
in a two dimensional model. As the new media, especially blogs, video platforms and
podcasts are channels that can be used in very individual ways there may be a variety
of different manifestations that are more or less related to the models presented here.
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In this chapter, I do not claim to model the general process of reviewing in social media,
but I want to elucidate these specific occasions where products are compared to each
other in a review by a host influencing his followers buying decisions.
This chapter is one of the first essays that model a certain process or aspect devel-
oped by using new media. The important insight provided, is that these processes can
be captured by using wellknown models and when introducing specific new character-
istics. This is an important step in order to learn more about mechanisms in online
communities.
A multitude of guidebooks for social media marketing is available like Hettler (2012).
There are several introductions to new media as Lister (2009) examining the different
aspects of new media also including “on demand TV services”, fandoms and other com-
munities as well. Besides these very general overviews there are more specific paper
focusing on certain aspects like Johnson and Kaye (2004) who investigate the perceived
credibility of webblogs or Mangold and Faulds (2009) analyzing new media as part of
the promotion mix of firms. Liu et al. (2007) investigating the influence of blog refer-
ences on product sales and develops a model for predictive usage.
Chen and Xie (2005) investigated Third-Party reviews but focus on evaluations by
official institutions and professionals only. In their subsequent paper, Chen and Xie
(2008) looked for the best reaction on product reviews e.g. providing the content on
the firms own web page. In their model, firms only react after receiving a review but are
neither able to optimize their product in beforehand nor to enter the decision process
actively. Dean and Biswas (2001) investigated third-party organization endorsements
and their effect on the prepurchase valuation on consumers.
Furthermore, his chapter adds to the advertisement literature in certain aspects as
the reviewing process can be seen as informative advertisement to some extend follow-
ing the classifications of Armstrong and Porter (2007). Also related is Friedman (1958)
as they introduce competitive behavior in advertising.
The models developed in this chapter base on a contest setting. There are two main
modeling approaches for rank-order tournaments commonly used in economics. The
first model was introduced by Tullock (1980) while the second model came up one year
later introduced by Lazear and Rosen (1981) using additive noise to model uncertainty
in the contest as variation to a first prize all-pay auction. In this context a model follow-
ing Tullock (1980) will be used. This typical rent seeking contest is characterized by full
information on all players with no probability distribution adding uncertainty needed.
In contrast to Lazear and Rosen (1981) the modeling structure of Tullock (1980) en-
sures a pure strategy solution in most cases.4 Nti (1999) enhanced Tullock’s model with
asymmetric valuations. His nomenclature is used to evaluate a simplified notation in
this chapter which becomes especially useful in the more complex model versions. The
use of different valuation is significantly different to the modeling of different abilities
4The last model variation will show a case where this solution is not always guaranteed.
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like in Baik (1994) or Cornes and Hartley (2005). The asymmetry in valuations is part
of the objective function, while the asymmetry in abilities is influencing the structure
of the contest success function directly.
In this chapter, I show that joining this type of contest and using it as advertise-
ment possibility is attractive to firms with several characteristics. The contest is more
attractive to firms with low costs but producing decent quality products. Additionally,
it can be expected more beneficial for firms that are new in the market as these have
no consumers to lose in the contest but the contest gives the possibility to win lots
of new customers. The price plays two roles in this context. First, it determines the
profits from selling a product to a consumer. Second, it determines the hight of the
entrance fee, as the company has to provide his product to the host to enter the re-
viewing process. For this reason, it may be attractive to firms with high price products
in case they can gain lots of money from winning the contest and from finding new
customers but most likely this competition is more attractive to firms with lower price
products that are maybe even bought frequently. Interestingly especially those firms
who would like to not participate in these contests as they have a high reputation going
along with a high market share, are forced to enter these contests as the reviews are
highly requested. In consequence, these contests force these firms to keep their quality
high as they are not willing to risk losing customers.
Besides the possibility of using only quality as decisive variable, an alternative ap-
proach is presented where the taste of the host is crucial. It is shown how the new
approach can be converted to be analyzed according to the model derived in before-
hand. Following the idea, that hosts can use both an objective criterion as quality and
a subjective criterion as taste in their evaluation, the last model presents a version,
where both approaches are combined. It can be seen, that allowing for two variables
will lead most likely to more beneficial products for consumers as the rent dissipation
meaning the amount invested in both instruments overall rises. Furthermore, it be-
comes evident, that all results for the two-dimensional model hold only under a certain
condition following from the optimization process.5 It can be shown that the possibility
of using quality and taste in the contest is not always used by both players. There are
even cases, where nobody is using the second instrument. However, the option to aim
at the taste of the host is more likely to be used by the weaker opponent.
The situation of interest includes several aspects differing from a standard Tullock
model. For this reason the investigation and the modeling process evolve step by step.
At first, the situation is captured in a basic model (Section 2). This allows to draw
first intuitions from the basic setting before adding further aspects to address more
specific characteristics. In section 3, the possibility of losing customers by a bad review
is taken into account. In section 4, I present a way of modeling the blogger deciding on
their personal taste instead of the objective criterion quality. Furthermore, this section
provides a general interpretation of the expanded model and a discussion of possible
5This restriction has not been taken into account by Epstein and Hefeker (2003), who used a related
model. Considering the restriction some of their results would change or not hold in general.
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benefits for customers and firms. In section 5, I introduce a model that combines both
criteria, investigate the influence on the firms’ optimal decision and examine possible
benefits for consumers. Concluding remarks are given in section 6.
2. Basic Model
This basic modeling approach captures first characteristics of the setting being analyzed.
Firms offering a product can enter a contest, staged by a host of a social media channel.
The host evaluates the products and gives a review including a ranking of the reviewed
products. This assessment influences the purchasing decision of the followers attending
the channel. To prevent introducing too much complexity this chapter is constrained to
a contest situation between two players. In case of more than two players there would
certainly appear other phenomenas as shown by Cornes and Hartley (2005) for example.
The basic contest is only considering the quality x of a product i or j. This leads
to a straightforward contest success function (csf):
%i =
xi
xi + xj
(2.1)
As profit function, a very simple version is used to gain a first impression of the
mechanisms. The host has a specific number of people he reaches with his review and
a partial of this is willing to buy the specific type of product in the near future. This
amount of people willing to buy is called h. Therefore, in case of winning, the firm
earns hpi, where pi declares the price of the specific product, with pi ≥ 0. It can be
assumed, that the price is given for each firm, as it can be seen realistic that the pricing
process has already taken place for the whole market while this specific contest is not
influencing the pricing decision. The products being compared in the reviewing contests
can be in the same price range but differ in their quality. However, it can also occur
that a more expensive product is compared to a cheeper model. This can be caused
by different reasons. On the one hand there can be a firm producing a product with
similar performance but more efficiently in productions or with less margin while for
example the more expensive product is produced by a well known firm that prices in
higher levels. On the other hand two products can be compared for one use but have
different functions that are not all needed. In this case the price does not need to reflect
the actual value of the product for the specific use.
Πi = %ihpi − c(xi)− pi (2.2)
The cost function will depend on the quality choice xi. The higher the quality of the
product is, the higher the costs will be. To describe this effect and allow for additional
analysis regarding differences in costs, the cost function is defined as c(xi) = cixi, with
ci ≥ 0. As already mentioned for the prices, the costs may differ due to different pro-
duction processes of the firms but also for products with different ranges of functions
being compared for one specific use. It can be expected, that there are no fix costs of
production caused by the contest but the product has to be provided to the host to
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enter the contest so he is able to make a review.6 In the model, pi can be seen as entry
costs in order to take part in the contest.
The next step is to derive the optimal decisions on quality for each firm. For this
purpose the first order conditions of both players are considered.
FOC 1 : ∂Πi
∂xi
= hpi xj(xi+xj)2 − ci = 0
FOC 2 : ∂Πj
∂xj
= hpj xi(xi+xj)2 − cj = 0
FOC 1 & FOC 2 ⇒ pi
ci
xj =
pj
cj
xi (2.3)
To ensure calculating an optimal decision for both firms both second derivatives need to
be smaller than zero. Which is actually the case. The terms below can at most become
zero in case no quality is chosen which is not really a choice in this setting as quality
can only be bad but not nothing. However, even the zero case would be included.
SOC 1 : ∂2Πi
∂x2i
= −2hpi xj(xi+xj)3 < 0
SOC 2 : ∂
2Πj
∂x2j
= −2hpj xi(xi+xj)3 < 0
Inserting equation (2.3) in FOC 1 and FOC 2 leeds to the optimal solutions:
x∗i =
(
hpi
ci
)2 hpj
cj(
hpi
ci
+ hpj
cj
)2 (2.4)
This solution goes along with Nti (1999).7 He investigates asymmetric valuation in
rent-seeking contests. Instead, the factors h and pi can be seen as valuation following
Nti (1999). The asymmetry is introduced by the different prices. But this is not the
only factor influencing the valuation as can be seen in equations 2.4 and 2.5. This model
is using a more complex cost function as Nti decided to choose ci = 1. The optimal
result from Nti (1999) can be expressed as equations:
x∗i =
(Vi)2 Vj
(Vi + Vj)2
(2.5)
Following the notation introduced by Nti, the overall valuations of the firms can be ex-
pressed as Vi = hpici and Vj =
hpj
cj
. This way the differences in costs can be easily taken
into account talking about the valuation of a firm in this contest. A firm’s valuation
increases in the price it can demand and in the potential number of buyers they can win
as well. In contrast, the higher quality costs are, the lower is the valuation of winning
the contest.
6This is a common procedure, however there are e.g. cases where products are only provided for a
certain time frame. This point will also be addressed during the analysis.
7The factor r used to declare the degree of homogeneity in Nti (1999) is set to one in this model.
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Inserting the optimal quality choices in the contest success function (2.1) simplifies
to:
%∗i =
Vi
Vi + Vj
=
hpi
ci
hpi
ci
+ hpj
cj
(2.6)
In the following, comparative statics are performed to get a better understanding
in the mechanics between the different factors of the firm’s valuation on the optimal
choices, the resulting probabilities.
∂x∗i
∂h
= cicjp
2
i
(cjpi + cipj)2
> 0
As h declares the number of buyers descending to buy the product because of the con-
test won, it is intuitive that an increase in this number increases the expected gain
and in consequence leads to a willingness to improve quality to perform better. As the
number of influenceable people correlated to the reach of the host channel it is obvious
that larger channels get products offered for reviews more often as the expected revenue
is higher than for smaller channels. Furthermore, channels with larger audience can be
expected to reflect the opinion of the customers much better. This means, basing the
quality decision on opinions of hosts with large followership can be seen as potential
good estimates for the consumers preferences. As h is influencing both firms equally,
the winning probabilities %i and %j are not influenced by changes in h.
∂x∗i
∂pi
=
2hcicjpip2j
(cjpi + cipj)3
> 0
In case of rising prices earnings grow as well while the number of followers potentially
buying is assumed to stay the same. For this reason each product sold becomes more
valuable which increases the motivation to increase the quality provided.
∂%∗i
∂pi
= cicjpj(cjpi + cipj)2
> 0
In consequence, higher prices lead to higher quality which increases the probability to
get the better review and thereby win the contest.
∂x∗i
∂ci
= − 2hcjp
2
i p
2
j
(cjpi + cipj)2
< 0
Increasing costs shrink the profits made by selling a product. For this reason, the
motivation to sell pieces is lower i.e. to reduce quality becomes more attractive.
∂%∗i
∂ci
= − cjpipj(cjpi + cipj)2 < 0
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In consequence, the lower quality caused by the higher costs leads to lower probability
to get a positive review especially better than the opponent and to win the contest.
∂x∗i
∂pj
= p
2
i cjh(cjpi − cipj)
(cjpi + cipj)3
> 0 if cjpi > cipj ⇔ pi
ci
>
pj
cj
The influence of changes in the opponent’s prices depends on a condition that can be
interpreted in several different ways. Regarding Nti (1999) the condition pi
ci
> pj
cj
is
equivalent to Vi > Vj as Vi was equivalent to hpici in this model. Considering the optimal
csf given in equation (2.1) Vi > Vj means that firm i is stronger while firm j is the
underdog in the contest. It can be seen as well that the valuations Vi can be reduced
to the price to cost ratio of each firm in this condition i.e. the firm having the better
price cost ratio is the stronger firm. In other words, margin compared in relation to
the costs changes the way a firm reacts to a price change of his opponent.
∂%∗i
∂pj
= − cicjpi(cjpi + cipj)2 < 0
If the firm i is the underdog and firm j rises her prices the rising quality firm j is offering
demotivates firm i resulting in even lower quality produced by the underdog. In case
of firm i dominating the contest an increase in pj also motivates firm i to increase the
quality of her product. The reaction of %i reveals that this increase in quality in case
of i being the stronger firm never evens out the increase in xj as the influence on the
csf is always negative.
∂x∗i
∂cj
= p
2
i pjh(cipj − cjpi)
(cjpi + cipj)3
< 0 if cjpi > cipj ⇔ pi
ci
>
pj
cj
A similar condition decides about the reaction on changes in the opponent’s costs. In
case of firm i being stronger the rising costs of j lead to shrinking quality of j allowing
also i to reduce quality slightly as the competition becomes tight. However, in case
of being the underdog, firm i would use the weakness of her opponent to increase her
chances by increasing the quality produced.
∂%∗i
∂cj
= cipipj(cjpi + cipj)2
> 0
In both cases an increase in the opponents costs leads to an advantage for firm i whether
it raises or lowers quality depends on the valuations.
Using the profit function (2.2) and inserting the optimal solution into the csf leads
to the expected profits in equilibrium.
Π∗i =
V 3i ci
(Vi + Vj)2
− pi =
(
hpi
ci
)3
ci(
hpi
ci
+ hpj
cj
)2 − pi
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As the contest is only profitable in case the expected profits of participation are larger
or equal zero. This means the profit function being positive can be seen as participation
constraint. For this reason there are factors increasing the attractiveness of entering
the reviewing process while others are impedimental.
∂Π∗i
∂h
=
c2jp
3
i
(cjpi + cipj)2
> 0
As h is a positive factor in each revenue function, the expected optimal profit rises
with increasing h. The degree a firm can profit from this increase in potential buyers
depends on the price it is able to get out of the sells of her product and also on the
costs the other firm has producing their quality.
Changes in price pi influence the profit in two different ways. First, an increase in
price increases the revenue. Second, a product has to be provided to the host for the
review. These costs are fix and necessary to enter this type of contest. For this reason,
the influence of rising prices is positive in case the marginal revenue is larger than one.
∂Π∗i
∂pi
=
c2jhp
2
i (cjpi + 3cipj)
(cjpi + cipj)3
− 1 > 0 if c
2
jhp
2
i (cjpi + 3cipj)
(cjpi + cipj)3
> 1
In consequence, firms with more pricy products have a higher threshold to even enter
this contest. In the field, there are also arrangements where products are only lent for
a limited period. However, this is not only advantages for the firm. The time limit can
prevent the product from being compared to several products as there may be more
than one comparable product in the market. Sometimes it can even lead to the instance
that the host is not able to directly compare it to any product at all.8 Additionally,
a product provided to the host is more likely to become his favorite product, as he
does not have to buy it as it is already his property. Usually the personally preferred
product is used as kind of anchor for quality and mentioned in many following contest
situation most likely in a positive way. This increases buying incentives for the followers
in a strong way especially as these hosts often produce some kind of peer effects as e.g.
investigated by Entorf and Lauk (2008) investigating social multipliers or Moretti (2011)
looking at consumption decisions.
∂Π∗i
∂ci
= − 2hc
2
jp
3
i pj
(cjpi + cipj)3
< 0
Increases in cost reduce profit directly but also reduce the probability of winning, be-
cause the incentives to produce high quality shrink. Inefficiently high cost are not only
8Multiple contests are not modeled in this chapter but possible extensions are practiced in reality.
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debilitating in the market but making the contest less attractive.
∂Π∗i
∂pj
= − 2c
2
jhp
3
i pj
(cicjpi + ci)3
< 0
An opponent rising prices is always decreasing the probability to win meaning gaining
some profit from the contest. E.g. a firm with strong reputation that is able to demand
high prices is a strong opponent that is maybe even able to prevent the firm from
entering the contest.
∂Π∗i
∂cj
= 2cicjhp
3
i pj
(cjpi + cipj)3
> 0
Same applies for firms being able to produce very cost efficient. A high quality prod-
uct produced in Europe with high costs can find a dangerous competitor in a product
produced for lower costs e.g. in Asia while providing decent quality.
These investigations provided an application of Nti (1999) as well as a more detailed
idea of valuations represented by asymmetric prices, costs and a symmetric parameter
h. However, choosing r = 1 and ci = 1 reduce the equation to the results from Nti
(1999) with Vi = pi.9 Especially the new interpretation of the valuation as price to
cost ratio influencing decisions is important as it can display profitability of the firm.
In contrast to Nti (1999) in this chapter, the influence of the quality choice is set in
relation to the changes in winning probability. It has been explained above that the
opponent’s valuation causes different quality adjustments in case of being the stronger
player or the underdog in the contest. However, the resulting csf reflecting the relation
between both quality choices is always influenced in the same way, independent of the
leadership.
3. Extended Model
The first modeling part aimed to provide a good intuition for the basic mechanisms.
However, there are further aspects important when looking at reviewing processes and
their results on sales. Getting a positive review is definitely increasing the overall sales
but getting a negative review will not leave the sales unaffected, too. Every firm has a
certain market share and a negative publicity can reduce this. E.g. a high end Dell lap-
top is one of the most powerful laptops on the market. If this laptop is not performing
well and consistent for a host and has diverse errors, this can drastically reduce trust
in the brand and result in decreasing sales.
The new revenue function will include this possibility of losses in case of losing the
competition. As the winning probability is given by %i, (1 − %i) it declares the proba-
bility that player i loses the competition. In consequence, losses are encountered with
the factor (1− %i).
9In general, propositions 4 and 5 apply to the presented model as well, the cost parameter simply
causes the inverse reactions as the price parameter.
3. EXTENDED MODEL 51
Πi = %ihpi − (1− %i)ηihpi − ci(xi)− pi (2.7)
The parameter ηi, with ηi ∈ [0, 1], declares the market share without the contest. In
case of losing, firm i will lose the part of the followers that would have bought their
products without seeing the contest outcome or the bad review, respectively. This
means the sales will reduce by ηih in case of being inferior.
This possibility of losing money entering the contest is adding riskiness to the out-
come and will have influence on the optimization.
FOC : ∂Πi
∂xi
= hpi
xj
(xi + xj)2
(1 + ηi)− ci = 0
Again, the second order conditions ensure that the result is indeed an optimal solution
for both firms.
SOC : ∂
2Πi
∂x2i
= −2hpi(1 + ηi) xj(xi + xj)3 < 0
As it can be easily seen looking at the first order condition, this new variation intro-
duced can be reduced to an additional factor following the notation of Nti (1999):
Vi =
hpi(1 + ηi)
ci
The additional factor (1+ηi) implies that a higher market share goes along with a higher
valuation in this contest. This means, a high market share makes it more important to
win the competition. This can be seen in the new optimal choices, as well:
x∗i =
(
hpi(1+ηi)
ci
)2 hpj(1+ηj)
cj(
hpi(1+ηi)
ci
+ hpj(1+ηj)
cj
)2
The new optimal choice for j is equivalent. Together, these two terms yield the new
corresponding winning probabilities where %∗j is again equivalent to %∗i .
%∗i =
hpi(1+ηi)
ci
hpi(1+ηi)
ci
+ hpj(1+ηj)
cj
The comparative statics will be very similar for the old parameters included. The only
new aspect would be the additional factor (1+ηi). For this reason the upcoming analy-
sis is narrowed down to the new parameter ηi and how this factor influences the optimal
decision.10
∂x∗i
∂ηi
=
2cicjhp2i p2j(1 + ηi)(1 + ηj)2
(cjpi(1 + ηi) + cipj(1 + ηj))3
> 0
10In the end of the next section there is a table providing a summary of al comparative statics for
the extended model.
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The optimal quality choice increases in the market share. As the firm has more to lose,
the willingness to improve quality rises. E.g. being the brand leader means the firm
has the highest market share. This firm would highly suffer from losing this contest in
quality as clients expect a constant high quality so they would lose lots of customers.
∂%∗i
∂ηi
= cicjpipj(1 + ηj)(cjpi(1 + ηi) + cipj(1 + ηj))2
> 0
In reality this may even spill over to other products from the same brand as the brand
itself stands for high quality. In case this is proven wrong the brand itself can lose its
status to some extend. The reason why the firm wants to increase the quality is to
prevent failure as rising the quality increases the probability to win.
Facing an opponent with a high market share may again lead to different reactions
depending on the leadership as already seen in the section before.
∂x∗i
∂ηj
= cjhp
2
i pj(1 + ηi)2[cjpi(1 + ηi)− cipj(1 + ηj)]
(cjpi(1 + ηi) + cipj(1 + ηj))3
> 0 if pi(1 + ηi)
ci
>
pj(1 + ηj)
cj
A stronger firm i tries to keep up with the opponent who in return will increase the
quality along with a higher market share. However, being the underdog firm i will
resonate and reduce quality because of the strength of the opponent.
∂%∗i
∂ηj
= − cicjpipj(1 + ηi)(cjpi(1 + ηi) + cipj(1 + ηj))2 < 0
Even in case of firm i trying to catch up, the stronger position of the opponent will
always lead to a decrease in the probability to win independent of firm i being the
stronger firm or the underdog.
Π∗i =
V 3i ci
(Vi + Vj)2
− Vici − pi =
(
hpi(1+ηi)
ci
)3
ci(
hpi(1+ηi)
ci
+ hpj(1+ηj)
cj
)2 − (1 + h(1 + ηi))pi
Having a look at the expected profits, it can be seen that the extension of the model
leads to an additional term entering the profit function negatively.
For this reason firms with a higher share would realize higher losses. This goes along
with the observation that wellknown firms with high reputation and a strong position
in the market are very cautious to make no mistakes.
∂Π∗i
∂ηi
= −c
2
ihpip
2
j(1 + ηj)2(3cjpi(1 + ηi) + cipj(1 + ηj))
(cjpi(1 + ηi) + cipj(1 + ηj))3
< 0
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But, a strong opponent causes a reduction in the expected revenue as well. The high
quality realized by the competitor leads to a higher probability to actually lose the
tournament and realize the losses.
∂Π∗i
∂ηj
= − 2cic
2
jhp
3
i pj(1 + ηi)3
(cjpi(1 + ηi) + cipj(1 + ηj))3
< 0
As it can be seen above, a higher ηi can make it very unattractive to enter the contest.
On the one hand, a firm facing a very strong opponent may not be willing to enter the
contest as chances of losing would be too high. On the other hand, a firm with a high
market share has much at stake, that even with a very low probability of failing, losses
would be rather painful.
Unfortunately, especially these well known firms are often big players who are very
requested by the followers to be reviewed. For this reason, these firms are mostly not
able to choose wether or not to enter the contest. The hosts can either buy these prod-
ucts on their own or lent it somewhere. An other possibility is, that a retailer sponsors
the product or lent it for review in exchange for being mentioned by the host. In this
case, the entrance fee has not to be paid by the known firm but is payed by someone
else. Unknown firms are still able to choose whether or not to enter the contest. This
will be profitable if they are able to compete with the high quality standards of the
known firm in any means. In this case of an unknown firm with a product of solid qual-
ity it might be beneficial to enter the contest as it might be inexpensive but effective
advertising.
4. Taste Model
Product tests performed by institutions try to be as objective as possible. However, this
is different for hosts making reviews. Followers want to know the personal opinion of
the blogger. How they think about quality, usefulness and handiness. The personality
of the host is a very important characteristic in Blogs and Channels. Many bloggers or
vloggers (video bloggers) publish content on their private life, what they are doing at
the moment, what experiences they are making and what they are thinking about. A
blog is forming a community where the followers are not only interested in the infor-
mation they are receiving but in the person as well. For this reason many hosts make
FAQ videos, where they answer many questions about themselves not only regarding
the topic their channel is dealing with, but about their personal opinion and life as well.
For this reason, they produce so called “follow me arounds” to introduce them to their
life, their work, their background like Slimani (2013). The relation between a host and
his followers is always much more private than between an editor and the readers, for
example. For this reason, especially subjective opinions can be evaluated very accu-
rately by the consumers as they have lots of background information on the reviewer.
Why is this difference so important? One could expect a higher quality product
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to be always better respectively preferred to a lower quality product. However, as a
product can be used for different purposes the demands of the consumers can differ.
A professional photographer looking for a new camera may prefer a very reliable solid
camera. In case he is working in a studio resting the camera on a tripod most of the
time, he will not care about the weight as much. In consequence, he would claim a big
sturdy camera of good quality as fitting to its taste. A travel photographer on the other
hand is looking for a solid and reliable camera as well but it also has to be lightweight
and got to be carried around the whole day. Both are looking for a good camera but
have very different ideas what that means.
These tastes need to be met by the product to be bought by the customers. It can
be assumed, that the taste of the followers resemble the taste of the host as they would
otherwise not visit this channel for informational reasons. Certainly, there are some
more entertaining channels on the internet, providing more comedy like content. How-
ever, they may be good for publicity of the product and for creating a certain image,
this is not modeled in this chapter.
This aspect of taste can be introduced in the model above by some minor adjust-
ments: instead of using the quality xi as variable of choice for the csf, an indicator of
the fit of the product to the taste of the host can be used. The new interpretation
will be called di11. As a higher quality is indicated by a higher number, the distance is
wished to be smaller to be better. To transform the distance indicator into a variable
behaving as the quality the taste variable ti can be defined as follows:
ti =
1
di
(2.8)
Because ti is increasing when the distance decreases, a higher number in ti is preferred.
Thus, the new variable ti can be introduced in the model replacing xi. The new csf is
given by:
%i =
ti
ti + tj
=
1
di
1
di
+ 1
dj
(2.9)
The new profit function the firm is confronted with, by following the model presented
above, will be given by:
Πi = %ihpi − (1− %i)ηihpi − si(di)− pi (2.10)
It can be assumed that the cost function will differ to the cost of quality. The new
cost function si(di) can be interpreted as a representation of search costs for the firm
analyzing the taste of the hosts and the followership they are representing. In reality
some hosts even stay in contact with the firms giving feedback on the products and
convey the desires of their followers. According to the cost function used in the model
on quality, the cost function for search costs is defined as si(di) = si 1di = siti = si(ti).
11The underlying variable di could be calculated using the distance measured between the preference
of the host θh and the preferences the product is meeting θi: di = |θi − θh|.
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Table 2.1: Summary
Valuation Situation Variable Consumer Firm
price pi ↑ xi ↑ Πi ↑*
i stronger pj ↑ xi ↑ Πi ↓
i weaker pj ↑ xi ↓ Πi ↓
share ηi ↑ xi ↑ Πi ↓
i stronger ηj ↑ xi ↑ Πi ↓
i weaker ηj ↑ xi ↓ Πi ↓
costs ci ↑ xi ↓ Πi ↓
i stronger cj ↑ xi ↓ Πi ↑
i weaker cj ↑ xi ↑ Πi ↑
si ↑ di ↑ Πi ↓
i stronger sj ↑ di ↑ Πi ↑
i weaker sj ↑ di ↓ Πi ↑
*Only under the condition shown in part 2.
As the relationship between di and ti is negative, the derivative of si(di) in di is negative
as well, in other words: to decrease the difference between the preferences the search
costs increase.
∂si(di)
∂di
< 0 while ∂si(ti)
∂ti
> 0
Regarding the interpretation of the model results, there are two perspectives that of
the customers and of the firms. Customers want to maximize their utility and it can
be assumed that a higher quality product or a product fitting their taste better, re-
spectively, is increasing their utility. For this reason a higher investment in the contest
is positive for customers. This is different to the consideration in the standard rent
seeking literature. In rent seeking contests the aim is to have a preferably low effort
as this effort can be seen as wasted. Again, in this model the pricing decision for the
product is assumed to be made in beforehand.
In this model, three types of valuations can be differentiated: the price, share and
costs. All can be reduced to the valuation term following Nti (1997) during the op-
timization process but they influence the decision differently as they enter the profit
function in different ways (See Table 2.1).
The first row of each category depicts the reaction on variations in the factors of the
own firm. A decrease in quality costs is positive for customers as well as for the firm as
the product will be better as well as the expected profit will increase. An increase in
the market share ensures good products for the customers but leads to higher expected
losses and therefore to lower expected profits. The market share is often linked to high
prestige for firms and even lower profits are approved to increase the market share (e.g.
Simon (2015)). However, the results presented in this chapter indicat that a lower mar-
ket share would be more desirable in some cases. The higher potential losses caused by
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the higher marked share should not be neglected in the overall calculation.
An increase in prices leads to better products and higher profits. This establishes
a positive relation between increasing prices and quality. Certainly, the price can be
expected to influence the utility of the consumer negatively at the same time. For this
reason a higher market share and therefore higher losses are likely to be more preferable
for customers than an increase in price leading to better products. Lower costs can be
considered as positive for the firm as well as for the customers in general. In contrast,
the effects of market share and price could depend on the actual preferences of the
firm and the customer which may not only be influenced by better products and higher
profits as described above.
Regarding changes in the opponent’s valuation it can be seen that a reduction of the
distance between the two firms is always resulting in a better product as the compe-
tition gets closer. In this context the distinction between the reaction as stronger and
weaker firm becomes comprehensible. The perspective changes at the point of being
even and therefore the reaction differs for the two cases. The expected profit always
suffers in case of an increase in valuation on the opponent’s side (meaning an increase
in price or share as well as a decrease in costs).
5. Combined Model
The previous chapters considered either quality or taste as relevant variable for the
valuation. However, these are two extremes: one being very objective, only looking at
the quality and one being totally subjective, considering just the individual taste. It
can be expected that a more realistic evaluation will take both aspects into account.
Most reviewers will consider the quality as well as the individual taste to a certain
amount. For this reason, a csf that combines both aspects would be of interest. It can
be seen as most reasonable that quality and taste will work together as complements.
A higher quality product that fits the taste will be valued much higher.
%i =
xi(1 + αti)
xi(1 + αti) + xj(1 + αtj)
(2.11)
This new csf includes taste as additional aspect. The influence it has on the overall
decision is reflected by α ≥ 0. With an α of 0 the model reduces to the objective model
regarding quality only. This csf follows the model introduced by Epstein and Hefeker
(2003). As there are now two aspects entering the decision process, the firm’s profit
function needs to be adjusted as well:
Πi = %ihpi(1 + ηi)− ηihpi − cixi − siti − pi (2.12)
The profit function developed in Section 3 is now enlarged by an additional cost func-
tion. Now both costs for quality xi as well as taste ti are considered. In contrast to
Epstein and Hefeker (2003), I use a distinct cost function for each instrument as it is
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very unlikely that both aspects will cause the same costs.
The new first order conditions are:
FOC 1 : ∂Πi
∂xi
= 0 ⇔ xj(1 + αtj)(1 + αti)(xi(1 + αti) + xj(1 + αtj))2
h(1 + ηi)pi
ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
V ci
= 1
FOC 2 : ∂Πj
∂xj
= 0 ⇔ xi(1 + αti)(1 + αtj)(xi(1 + αti) + xj(1 + αtj))2
h(1 + ηj)pj
cj︸ ︷︷ ︸
V cj
= 1
FOC 3 : ∂Πi
∂ti
= 0 ⇔ xj(1 + αtj)αxi(xi(1 + αti) + xj(1 + αtj))2
h(1 + ηi)pi
si︸ ︷︷ ︸
V si
= 1
FOC 4 : ∂Πj
∂tj
= 0 ⇔ xi(1 + αti)αxj(xi(1 + αti) + xj(1 + αtj))2
h(1 + ηj)pj
sj︸ ︷︷ ︸
V sj
= 1
Again, a valuation type term can be defined that differs in the costs for each instru-
ment. For this reason, the valuation including quality costs will be called V ci while the
valuation depending on the costs for meeting the taste will be named V si .
Using the first order conditions, several relations between the choice variables can
be derived:
R 1 : (FOC 1 & FOC 2) xj = xi
V cj
V ci
R 2 : (FOC 3 & FOC 4) tj = ( 1α + ti)
V sj
V si
− 1
α
R 3 : (FOC 1 & FOC 3) xi = ( 1α + ti)
V ci
V si
R 4 : (FOC 2 & FOC 4) xj = ( 1α + tj)
V cj
V sj
The optimal choices having two instruments are calculated in the following.
x∗i =
(V ci )2(V cj V si V sj )
(V ci V si + V cj V sj )2
The optimal choice from the one dimensional model was x∗i =
(Vi)2Vj
(Vi+Vj)2
. It can be seen,
even better than in Epstein and Hefeker (2003), that the characteristics stay the same.
The corresponding valuation V ci has a quadratic influence on the optimal decision while
all remaining valuations, for the other instrument as well as both of the opponent, enter
single only.
t∗i = max
{
(V si )2(V ci V cj V sj )
(V ci V si + V cj V sj )2
− 1
α
, 0
}
(2.13)
The optimal choice for the second instrument is equivalent to the first one but includes
the negative term 1
α
reflecting the influence of the weighting factor α in the reviewing
process. While x∗i is always larger or equal to 0, as the valuations can only be larger or
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equal 0, t∗i could become negative for small α. As the taste variable should not become
smaller 0 it yields t∗i = 0 for those cases.
%∗i =
V ci V
s
i
V ci V
s
i + V cj V sj
(2.14)
Again the result from the one-dimensional model was very similar, %∗i = ViVi+Vj , but now
the winning probability depends on the valuations of each instrument.
In order to ensure investigating optima, the second derivative has to be considered.
As the optimization problem has enlarged to two instruments, the Hessian matrix has
to be negative semidefinite. Unfortunately this important step is missing in Epstein
and Hefeker (2003).
In standard Tullock contests the second order condition is easily met but in the two
dimensional case the Hessian has to be negative semidefinite i.e. condition 1 and 3 need
to be fulfilled, ensuring the first leading principal minor to be negative and the second
to be positive.
Condition 1 : H11 =
∂2Πi
∂x2i
= −2(1 + αiti)
2hpi(1 + ηi)(xj + αtjxj)
(xi + αtixi + xj + αtjxj)3
≤ 0
Condition 2 : H22 =
∂2Πi
∂t2i
= −2α
2(1 + αtj)hpi(1 + ηi)x2ixj
(xi + αtixi + xj + αtjxj)3
≤ 0
H12 =
∂Πi
∂xi∂ti
= α(1 + αtj)hpi(1 + ηi)xj(−(1 + αti)xi + xj + αtjxj)(xi + αtixi + xj + αtjxj)3
Condition 3 : H11 ∗H22 −H212 ≥ 0 if xj(1 + αtj) ≤ 3[xi(1 + αti)]
As shown above, conditions 1 and 2 are the same as the second order conditions in
standard Tullock contests. The derivative is negative in both cases. The more delicate
part is contidion 3. This equation holds under certain conditions only. 12
In the following it will be derived under which circumstances the optimization is
valid: For this purpose two relationships xi = xj V
c
i
V cj
(R1) and ti = ( 1α + tj)
V si
V sj
− 1
α
(R2)
are used.
xi
V cj
V ci
(
1 + α
(( 1
α
+ ti
) V sj
V si
− 1
α
))
≤ 3[xi(1 + αti)]
⇔ xi
V cj
V ci
(
(1 + αti)
V sj
V si
)
≤ 3[xi(1 + αti)]
⇔ V
c
j
V ci
(
(1 + αti)
V sj
V si
)
≤ 3(1 + αti) (2.15)
12The condition would be equivalent for Epstein and Hefeker (2003).
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As it can be seen above, the ratio between the valuations of both firms is important.
If the ratios are 1, the equation holds but if the differences are too large the condition
will not be met any longer. This means, for competitors with valuations in the same
range the optimization can be done.
In order to derive an exogenous condition the optimal solution t∗i from equation
(2.13) is inserted in the inequality (2.15).
V cj
V ci
≤ (6 + V
s
i )V cj V sj + 3V ci V si (2 + αV si V cj V sj )
V ci V
s
i + V cj V sj
(2.16)
The same must hold for the opponent at the same time.
V ci
V cj
≤ (6 + V
s
j )V ci V si + 3V cj V sj (2 + αV sj V ci V si )
V cj V
s
j + V ci V si
(2.17)
As both instruments will not become smaller 0 we have an interior solution in case
the conditions (2.16) and (2.17) are fulfilled. In this case, the extremum is the only
extremum and therefore is a maximum. This is the optimal point. We have an interior
extremum in all cases except those where the second instrument is zero. For further
calculations, the condition is assumed to be fulfilled.
In order to gain intuition in which cases the condition (2.16) may hold, I investigate
the limits for the different valuations going towards 0.
V cj → 0 : 0 ≤ 6
If their own valuation for quality of the opponent goes towards 0 the condition will
be always fulfilled. This is intuitive as in this case the opponent becomes weaker.
However, this condition has to hold for both players at the dame time. The next limit
will show, that in the above case the opponents condition would not hold and therefore
no equilibrium would exist.
V ci → 0 : V cj ≤ 0  
Letting the own valuation for quality go toward 0 would need the opponents evaluation
to be negative. This means, the condition cannot be fulfilled in the limit. This goes
along with the intuition presented above that the valuations should not be too different
to have the condition been fulfilled.
V sj → 0 :
V cj
V ci
≤ 6
Similar results can be found looking at the valuations for taste. If this valuation goes
towards 0 the ratio between the valuation for quality has to be in a certain range. The
same holds for their own valuation for taste.
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V si → 0 :
V cj
V ci
≤ 6
As mentioned above, the second instrument is not always used. This has been shown
by Epstein and Hefeker (2003) for their model in beforehand. In this specific model
the condition slightly changes. To derive the condition, the optimal solution given in
equation (2.13) is used.
ti ≥ 0 if
(V si )2(V ci V cj V sj )
(V ci V si + V cj V sj )2
≥ 1
α
(2.18)
Now the valuations are expressed in terms of each other following the idea of Epstein
and Hefeker (2003) as V cj = kcV ci and V sj = ksV si . Inserting this in the equation above
leads to the condition given in equation (2.19).
(V si )2(V ci kcV ci ksV si )
(V ci V si + kcksV ci V si )2
≥ 1
α
⇔ V si ≥
(1 + kcks)2
αkcks
(2.19)
⇒ tj ≥ 0 if V si ≥
(1 + kcks)2
αkc(ks)2 (2.20)
Using V sj = ksV si and otherwise performing the same transformations for firm j as for
firm i leads to equation (2.20). Inserting the comparative way of expressing the valua-
tions using kc and ks in equation (2.14) reveals that firm i is leading if kcks > 1.
For i being stronger it follows, that if V si ≥ (1+k
cks)2
αkcks
both use their second instrument
ti and if (1+k
cks)2
αkcks
≥ V si ≥ (1+k
cks)2
αkc(ks)2 only j uses the second instrument. In consequence
depending on the difference in valuations both firms, no firm or just the weaker firm
will use the second instrument.
Having a second instrument at choice in this reviewing process, it is straightforward,
as result 2 from Epstein and Hefeker (2003) shows, that the chosen amount of the first
instrument tends to be smaller than with one alone. This means the quality will be
at least not higher than in the one dimensional case. On the other hand consumers
now get a product with possibly slightly lower quality but more fitting to specific needs
which may increase their overall utility. Epstein and Hefeker (2003) proved that rent
dissipation, RD = xi+xj + ti+ tj, increases for small differences in valuation. Hence, a
close enough contest can be expected to provide more utility for the customers in case
of having two instruments at choice.13
This last step modeled in this chapter showed a possibility to combine the two as-
13Epstein and Hefeker (2003) argue in Result 3 that for larger differences in valuation the rent
dissociation will decrease. However, in case the difference in valuation is large enough an equilibrium
may not be ensured as shown above. In consequence, it would be very important for Epstein and
Hefeker (2003) to consider the limitations in optimization occurring by introducing a second instrument
in a Tullock contest.
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pects taste and quality in a reviewing process using a Tullock type contest. As shown
above, this is possible for contests with opponents having a small enough difference in
valuation, only. Otherwise the results are no longer guaranteed to provide an optimal
result. Adapting to the results of Epstein and Hefeker (2003) the second instrument is
more likely to be used by the underdog. Furthermore, the possibility of having a sec-
ond instrument at hand increases the rent dissipation compared to the one instrument
model. This means that especially younger firms being the underdog in the competi-
tion will use the possibility to adapt to fit the taste of the host. This can be seen in
reality as these upcoming firms are usually more active in social media and therefore
doing more search regarding what taste a host has. This might not be able to make the
underdog becoming leading in probability but increases the probability to win after all.
However, including the taste provides the consumers with a product increasing their
utility most likely as the performance of both products will be raised. At the same
time, the negative influence on profits might be small, as the modern firms are more
familiar with social media which reduces their costs for using the second instrument
most likely.
6. Conclusion
Blogs and channels are playing a more and more important role in advertising and
marketing. For this reason, new media with its rules and new processes are becoming
more interesting for firms and scientists. Modern firms are almost forced to engage in
social media and other online channels in order to decide how to position their company
in this environment.
In this chapter, I modeled the evaluation process of a host reviewing and comparing
two products. The level of complexity increases taking losses and different evaluation
criteria into account. The models reveal that prices, costs and market share can be
converted in a valuationlike variable. It has been shown above that, nevertheless the
influence of these three types of valuations enter the optimization process similarly in-
fluence the objective function of the firm in totally different ways.
The comparative statics of the one dimensional model permitted several insights.
On the one hand, especially unknown firms with lower costs and lower prices that are
producing decent quality products might be able to benefit from this type of contests.
These firms can use the contest as inexpensive advertisement to promote their product
and to win new customers. On the other hand, firms that own a high market share are
those who suffer the most from the possibility of losing customers due to the contest
outcome. However, these firms are often not able to avoid the contest situation as they
are requested to be compared in the reviewing process. In consequence, the firms do
not need to invest the entrance fee of sending in a product but are forced to compete
because the host buys or lends the product itself or the product is provided by a retailer
for being named as sponsor. This mechanism of holding a known and successful firm
in the contest forces the firm to increase the quality of the product even further to
minimize the probability of experiencing the potentially large losses in case of being
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beaten by another firm.
After providing possibilities how to model an objective competition in quality as well
as looking at the possibility of subjective evaluations where the firms want to match the
host’s taste best, both, the objective and the subjective criteria, should be combined
in one contest where the amount of subjective evaluation may vary. This setting is
investigated in the last model presented. This two-dimensional approach models taste
as additional instrument to quality entering as complement in the evaluation process.
This chapter reveals that the optimal solution is only guaranteed to be existing under
certain conditions where the difference in valuations is sufficiently small. This restric-
tion has not been taken into account by Epstein and Hefeker (2003). For the optimal
solutions, it can be seen that the winning probability is determined by costs of the first
and second instrument equally. The weight of the second instrument enters as threshold
for the second instrument being used only.
It has been shown that the possibility to meet the taste of a host is especially at-
tractive for the weaker firm and is used by these firms more likely. Considering the
possible benefits for the customers, the evaluation process including subjective and
objective criteria is most likely to increase the utility of the consumers as the rent
dissipation rises for firms being sufficiently similar in valuations. In consequence, this
model underlines a reason why the new rules in new media provide the consumers with
more benefits not only because they are informed better but because their utility might
be increased even more, because of products with better quality respectively a better fit.
In this chapter, I gave an example on how new media implement new processes that
include new characteristics. The most important insight given is, that even in this new
setup, mechanisms can still be led back to wellknown models like the Tullock tourna-
ment model used in this case. The crucial point is to isolate new driving characteristics
and to include these into the old models. In my case, I introduced the aspect of a
subjective criterion that became reliable due to the personal contact between host and
followers. Furthermore, I presented a tournament model combining two criteria, the
subjective criterion, taste, and the objective criterion, quality.
In the upcoming years new media will even increase their importance in our every-
day life. Furthermore, they will become crucial for marketing and sales to some extend.
For this reason, research like it is presented in this chapter will become important in
order to understand the new conditions that are determining modern life. The online
world might seem very complex and vast, but this should not discourage researchers
from isolating and modeling particular aspects in order to gain important insights on
the world we are living in today.
Chapter 3
Women in Academia
Empirical Findings from Business
Administration in Germany
In this chapter, I analyse a data set of German PhD students and professors
in Business Administration (BA). It provides information on the trends in
prospects of women in a male dominated profession. The collected data re-
veal that since 1998 the transition rate from PhD students to professors for
women has become equal to that of men. While the increase in the percent-
age of female PhD students is quite linear, the trend in the percentage of
female professors shows a significant increase in the beginning of the 90th.
This is a remarkable increase especially when compared to the development
in the US. The change in trend coincides with the establishment of laws
to ensure gender equality in hiring new professors in Germany during the
nineties. In this chapter, I addresse the mentioned incidence via an event
study providing insights in the German gender equality laws introduced in
several federal states. Further analyses regarding the faculties’ composi-
tion and the decision of PhD students to become professors are featured.
Also, this chapter presents significant influences of fellow students’ gender
composition as well as the gender composition of full professors at a faculty.
1. Introduction
Life of women has changed drastically, especially during the last century. Whereas
merely a few decades ago, it was considered appropriate for a woman to raise children
and to do the housework, nowadays, double income households are likely to become
the new standard. In consequence, women are entering the labour market which leads
to changes in family structures, labour policy etc., though, not all women do choose to
work in typical female work fields like education, nursing or administrative assistance.
Interestingly, they started to enter male dominated sectors like finance, technology and
science to name just a few. These days, it is common that girls attend university like
their male age-mates. As this development is already ongoing for a while, one should
expect women to be represented in leading positions by now. However, even today
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women are rarely found in leading positions of big enterprises, banks, in politics or
science. Especially, the amount of female professors in academic fields like science or
economics is still relatively small.
Often, ad hoc examples and agglomerated data are used as arguments when dis-
cussing gender equality in careers. In this chapter, I use a data set on a specific male
dominated field to provide a stronger foundation than ad hoc examples would do while
providing more detailed insights than a more agglomerated data set. The first aim of
this chapter is to depict the current situation as well as the progress in the last decades.
In this chapter, I focus on the academic field of Business Administration (BA) using
data on full professors and doctoral students. BA is still male dominated in the aca-
demic world as well as in the world of business. Including professors, one of the highest
positions in an academic career, as well as PhD students, allows to compare the changes
in both career levels and to draw conclusions on the differences in gender equality in
both stages. To increase the assessability of the progresses, I will put the results in an
international context by using data from several academic fields in the US. The fact
that writing a doctoral thesis can be seen as a preliminary stage for a possible profes-
sorship combined with the circumstance that students are taught by professors allows
to investigate interactions between two career levels. It is possible that the gender dis-
tribution in an academic environment has an influence on decisions affecting women’s
careers. This thought will be addressed in this chapter focusing on the following two
aspects: First, in which way is the gender distribution correlated with the allocation of
female professors at the faculties – second, what is influencing the decision of women
for or against an academic career as a professor after making their doctorate.
The analysis shows that over the last decades, the amount of female PhD students
and professors in BA has raised to approximately one quarter respectively which is
low for PhD students but high for professors comparing to similar data from the US.
Additionally, the data show that since 1998 the transition rate from PhD students to
professors for women has become equal to that of men. While the increase in the per-
centage of female PhD students is quite linear, the trend in the percentage of female
professors features a significant increase in the beginning of the 90th. The growth of
the percentage of female German BA professors found in this chapter is impressive
compared to the development in the US. This change in trend coincides with the estab-
lishment of laws to ensure gender equality in hiring new professors in Germany during
the nineties.
This chapter addresses these changes in law via an event study having a deeper look
at the German gender equality laws introduced in the federal states. Additionally, the
dataset is analyzed regarding two different types of new laws, one with a priority rule
concerning the hiring of women and one without. Furthermore, this chapter features
an analysis of the faculties’ compositions. The investigation shows changes in gender
composition of full professors at the faculties regrading samples before and after 1994.
After 1994, the gender composition follows a ratio of approximately one quarter with
increasing tendency. There was found no influence of the gender composition of faculties
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on hiring decisions. Concerning the decision of PhD students to become professors, this
chapter shows significant influences of fellow students’ gender composition as well as
the gender composition of full professors at a faculty, whereas, the supervisor’s gender
does not seem to be related to the decision at all.
The next section gives an overview on literature of various research areas, related to
the questions discussed in this chapter. Before starting the investigation of the data set,
the collected data are characterized in detail in Section 3. Section 4 provides the whole
analysis. Finally, I will sum up the drawn insights and provide a couple of conclusive
thoughts.
2. Literature
To start from scratch: Men and women are different in certain aspects. This is an
insight conveyed by everyday experience as well as scientific findings. Numerous pub-
lications reveal a variety of aspects in which the behavior of both sexes differ. One of
the most widespread differences is the amount of risk aversion. Byrnes et al. (1999)
analyzed five different age groups in different tasks and found significant differences
between the two genders, especially for intellectual as well as for physical risk taking.
However, these differences are shrinking as the authors observed a smaller gender gap
for younger generations compared to older ones. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) look
at financial decision making of single women compared to single men and found women
to be more risk averse.1 They state, this could be part of the explanation why women
are less financially wealthy then men.
Another well known characteristic of females is their different attitude towards com-
petition. Already in early life, this pattern is intrinsic as described by Gneezy and
Rustichini (2004). In their experiment they observe 140 fourth grade children in their
running performance measuring their time needed single and in pair wise competition.
They found that the running times in single runs are not significantly different be-
tween girls and boys. However, in the competitive scenario girls ran significantly slower
while boys ran faster. This finding goes along with Gneezy et al. (2003), analyzing
the influence of a competitive environment on performance. They pointed out that the
difference in competitiveness also has an influence on the labour supply of women. Ad-
ditionally, their findings are not just that women perform better in piece rate paid tasks
than in tournaments, but, that they perform even worse competing against men then in
single sex tournaments. Ivanova-Stenzel and Kübler (2005) made the same observation
by analyzing team competition between male and female teams. They confirmed that
men spend more effort in presence of women even when they are in the same team – so
it seems not to be an incentive of beating the ’weak sex‘ but showing off in their presence.
As described by Finucane et al. (2000), the above mentioned differences in gender
do not seem to be the result of pure genetics – who observed an impact of culture on
1They also found that risk aversion depends on other factors as age, ethnic background or number
of children.
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competitiveness. In their paper the authors describe a gender difference in risk attitudes
among ’whites’ but not among other ethnic groups. They call this the ’white male’ ef-
fect. Thus, the cultural background can be crucial for the performance of the sexes. An
even more drastic example is provided by Gneezy et al. (2008). They investigated the
competitiveness of the Maasai, a very patriarchal society, and the Khasi, a matrilineal
Indian society. Finding Khasi women more competitive as Khasi men and even slightly
more competitive than Maasai men who are themselves twice as competitive as Maasai
women.
As some differences between men and women seem to be not intrinsic but culturally
rooted, they might be prone to changes in society. This thought has created several
movements during the last centuries and also found its way into sociological research.
Epstein (1970) describes how the culture of profession can limit women’s career options
as a profession may be considered as not being appropriate. He discusses the influence
of social changes on traditional structures. Correspondingly, there is a whole field of
literature looking at discrimination of women and minorities. In his book Becker (2010)
addresses this topic in a theoretical way while e.g. Blau and Ferber (1987) provide em-
pirical evidence of discrimination.
The economic perspective of this inequality builds the root of the enormous field
of research on the gender gap. Even theoretical models where formed to explain the
gender gap to some extend as in Lazear and Rosen (1990). However, most of the gen-
der gap literature is data based research Ferrer and Azmat (2013) who investigated the
gender gap in performance among associate lawyers in the United States. Interestingly,
they also found evidence, that career aspiration of women and men differ significantly.
A gender gap can be found in many situations like Goldin et al. (2006) who looked
at the gender gap among US college students from 1957 to 1992. Their work provides
evidence that gender gaps tend to narrow down over time accompanied by a controversy
and resulting in changes in society.
These changes in society, the behavior towards women and their appropriate behav-
ior, are just one aspect. Women’s identity – the way they see themselves – is changing
in this process as well, as described in Bertrand et al. (2010). In consequence, society
enables women to behave differently, but, the intrinsic aspiration of women changes as
well. This is crucial as it comes to affirmative actions to provide equal chances for both
sexes. The effects of affirmative actions and equal opportunity laws in an experimental
environment are shown by Schotter and Weigelt (1992). They found, starting from
an uneven tournament, affirmative actions lead to more effort over all subjects and, in
consequence, to more profit for the game administrator or principal.
However, it is not as simple as that. Probably the most popular and most discussed
affirmative action is a quota. Ellingsen et al. (2013) showed – also in an experimental
environment – that the introduction of a quota might induce undesirable effects. They
found that introducing a quota based selection rule causes uncooperative behavior. This
effect appeared for an initial performance based selection rule as the subjects selected
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via quota are seen as being there without deserving it. Even providing a fairness ar-
gument as explanation is not changing the uncooperative behavior. This effect totally
disappears by replacing the performance based selection by random choice. Several
paper investigate the consequences of introducing a quota in the field like Ahern and
Dittmar (2012) who analyzed the quota introduction in Norwegian boards of directors.
They recognized a significant drop in firm performance caused by the lack of qualified
women needed to fulfill the quota. Here, we see another difficulty in generating equality
by changing society. Not only the women have to be willing to fill in the positions they
are offered – as explained above, but, we need enough women being qualified to do so
as well.
An alternative device to induce changes in society and in female self-concept is the
introduction of role models. This is a much less intrusive tool then a politically enforced
quota. Marx and Roman (2002) found qualified female role models have significant in-
fluence on performance of women in examination situation. Gibson (2004) underlined
the influence of role models on our career especially in contrast to mentoring. According
to one of the research questions investigated in this chapter concerning the influence of
female faculty members on future decisions of doctoral students, Bettinger and Long
(2005) already hinted on a positive influence of female role models rising further interest
for their topic.
As I analyze the selection of female doctoral students into jobs, likewise, it con-
tributes to the class of selection literature like Bacolod (2007) who investigated the
selection of female workers into the profession of teaching. While he aims for the selec-
tion mechanism, this chapter intends to mainly quantify the status quo as well as the
developments over time.
There are related data sets like the data used by Bosquet et al. (2013) looking at
French concours data for promotions of professors. They focus on the competitiveness of
women finding that women entered the competition less often whereas the selected sam-
ple that entered performed as good as their male competitors. Ülkü-Steiner et al. (2000)
use survey data to analyze differences in graduate programs that are male-dominated
towards gender-balanced programs. They found evidence, that faculty’s gender compo-
sition influences career commitment and self-concept of female students in the direction
that both tend to be lower in male dominated environments.
3. Data
The data used in this chapter consists of two individual data sets. The first set com-
prises mile stones in career of German professors in Business Administration (BA) from
1971 to 2006. The data was collected by Rainer Haselmann (Goethe University Frank-
furt) and Matthias Kräkel (University Bonn). It includes variables like the place and
year of the professor’s graduation and habilitation as well as their supervisors’ names.
Furthermore, the data provides information on subsequent career stages with beginning
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and end dates. The second data set was collected for this chapter, specifically. It is a
data set of BA students who have finished their doctorate in BA in Germany. The data
was collected from two sources. The first source used were dissertation registers from
German universities. Over 20 % of the German universities provide information from
their dissertation registers. The first data point is from 1971 and the last observations
are from 2013. To fill in the gaps, data from the German national library (DNB) was
used. Every dissertation in Germany has to be transmitted to the DNB. For this rea-
son, we have a full record of all dissertations from 1990 till 2009. The search criteria
used were ’dissertation’ in the category of academic records and ’Economics (330)’ and
’Management (650)’ as subject categories. Additionally, only students having a super-
visor who is included in the professors’ data set were concidered. This step guarantees
that the definition of BA applied is congruent within both data sets.
The overall data set contains 23018 observations from Eastern and Western Ger-
many. To match gender data, forenames were used. For this purpose, 4879 names
were categorized, resulting in 22801 observations with matched gender.2 The data set
includes 961 professors. The register as well as the electronic doctoral theses from the
DNB contain information about the supervisors – using again the names to determine
the supervisor’s gender – providing 2289 observations with information about the su-
pervisor. In case there were multiple supervisors, always the first supervisor was chosen
as that person is expected to have the strongest impact. The professors’ data set also
includes the duration of dissertation, habilitation and each professorship. In the data
set on PhD students only the moment of finishing the doctoral thesis is documented.
The time needed to finish the thesis, was estimated with four years and is used accord-
ingly in the PhD students’ data set.3
There are several surroundings within you make a doctorate in Germany: at a chair
– working for the supervisor, at a graduate school, at a scientific institution or at a
company. As in Germany a supervisor with a full professorship at a German university
is needed to do a doctorate, all these tracks are included in the data set. However, the
used datasources have one drawback: Registers and the DNB catalog used to generate
the underlying data set do not contain many additional observed characteristics than
the ones used in this investigation. Of course it would be advantageous to have infor-
mation on e.g. cultural background, family status of students as well as professors. For
this reason, further causal analysis would require supplementary data. Nevertheless,
this extensive data set provides innovative information on the academic field of BA
in Germany over the last decades. It includes the full population of full professors in
Eastern and Western Germany for the observed period and the same for PhD students
after 1989.4
2It was not possible to translate all names into gender information as some names are not gender
specific.
3In Germany, universities award a doctoral degree. Strictly speaking, this is not the same as a PhD.
However, as it is used synonymously in normal parlance, PhD and doctorate are used synonymously
in this thesis.
4As described above, the sample is reduced to all observations having a gender specific name for
the following analysis.
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4. Analysis
This section is divided into four parts. In Section 4.1, we will have a look at the gen-
eral composition of the data set leading into deeper analysis regarding the development
of gender composition over the last decades. In Subsection 4.2, this part is followed
by a comparison within an international context using data from the US. Section 4.3
addresses the changes in law regarding hiring decisions in public service during the
nineties. Subsection 4.4 provides a deeper look at the faculties and their gender com-
positions. Finally, we will explore factors that might influence the doctoral students in
their career decisions (Subsection 4.5).
4.1 Women in Business Administration
When looking at the data set it becomes obvious that only a small proportion of PhD
students stays in academia and obtains a professorship in BA. The data comprises
23,801 PhD students (with known gender) but only 961 of these became BA profes-
sors, which implies that 21,840 completed PhDs deciding to choose a profession outside
academia or at least choose not to become a professor in their field. In stakes, only 4 %
of PhDs remain in academic research and train new generations of scientists in their
field (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Data Overview
Observation Total of Observations Females Males
Students 23040 - -
Names 1990 1263 3071
Students with known Gender 22801 5204 17597
Supervisors’ Gender 5534 1233 4238
Professors 961 132 829
Other Jobs 21840 5072 16768
Start year of dissertation 956 130 823
End year of dissertation 23018 5200 17513
Percentage of Professors 4 % 3 % 5 %
Percentage of Female Supervisors 7 % 11 % 6 %
The first panel quantifies variables of interest. All characteristics are also splitted into
observation numbers for the female and male subgroup. The variable “Names” contains
all names found in the data set that could be matched to gender. This data base was
used to determine students’ as well as supervisors’ gender. The second panel provides
some resulting proportions giving first hints on gender differences. The first line displays
the percentage of professorships on all job choices while the second line describes the
amount of female supervisors given the different subgroups of PhD students.
Looking at the amount of females in the data set, we see that women are in distinct
minority with 5,204 women. In percentage terms this translates into 77.18 % men and
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22.82 % women resulting in a ratio below 1:3. Table 3.1 reveals the selection of women
into the different career paths. Of the 961 professors only 132 are female (13.74 %)
while we have 5,072 women choosing other professions (23.68 %). In consequence, only
2.54 % of the women holding a PhD decided to become a professor. In contrast, nearly
twice as many of men (4.71 %) did so. Running a probit regression we get a coefficient
of -0.3*** (0.000) by regressing being a professor on the characteristic of being female.
(The p-value is given in parentheses.) In other words, the probability of females to
become professors is nearly 30 % lower than that of their male fellows.
Knowing that only a small fraction of PhDs in BA become professors the interesting
question is, how this fraction has developed over time. Figure 3.1 shows the total num-
ber of completed PhDs in each year since 1990 splittet in those who became a professor
in BA (mid grey) and all others (light grey).5 The total number of dissertations shows
a clearly increasing trend. From the beginning of the timeline in 1990 till the end in
2006 the number of students doing a doctorate in BA has more then doubled. However,
the amount of PhDs staying in academia as professors has decreased over time as the
percentages provided in Figure 3.1 illustrate.
Figure 3.1: Development of Job Decisions over Years
This diagram displayes the job decisions of PhDs over the years. The bar chart provides
the total numbers indicated on the left axes while the percentages are given in the graphs
with the scale on the right.
Plotting the percentage of PhDs in BA becoming a professor over the same period
emphasizes this observation (Figure 3.2). The overall tendency is clearly downward
trending. Starting at a value of around 5 %, it goes down to less than 1 % in 2005 and
5Here, the data set is displayed from the moment in time, where all sources are included – professors’
data, doctorate registers and DNB data.
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2006. This shows a change in the use of a doctoral degree. It has developed from the
entry stair to an academic career and a career in science to a qualification certificate
needed to enter a large amount of professions outside the academic and scientific field.
Figure 3.2: Percentage of Doctorals becoming BA Professor, Development over Years
This diagram shows how the percentages of PhDs becoming professor evolved over the
years. The development is also provided for the male and female subgroup.
Splitting the sample in male and female PhDs and observing the persistence rate
again, two different patterns become apparent. The percentage of females is lower then
the male one most of the time, in the first half of the sample. The male graph is alter-
nating at around 6 % while the female evolves at about 4 %. From 1998 onwards, both
develop surprisingly similar. This means, taking into account that less females decide
to make a doctoral degree, the amount of PhDs becoming professors in their field has
already balanced out regarding both sexes. In other words, the women who selected
themselves into the group of doctoral students behave as their male colleges, regarding
the decision to stay in academia.6 This is interesting, as – in the nineties – affirmative
actions were introduced by the governments of several German federal states in order
to give female PhD students equal opportunities to become a professor.7
The number of students making their doctoral degree is shown in Figure 3.3. The
positive trend can be seen for both, male and female doctoral students. Although,
the male doctoral students are still in majority, we can recognize a stronger increase
in female PhD students than in male. This is becoming more apparent in Figure 3.4
showing the percentage of female dissertations already starting in 1970. As we now look
6The finding goes along with Bosquet et al. (2013) showing that less women opt into a competition
while the selected sample in the competition behaves like their male opponents.
7This will be discussed in more depth in subsection 4.3.
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Figure 3.3: Dissertations over Years and Gender
This diagram displays the number of dissertations regarding the male and female sub-
groups. The bar chart is again providing the total numbers indicated on the left while
the percentages are given in graphs with scales on the right.
at proportions instead of absolute numbers, there is more data at disposal. From 1970
onwards, there is data on dissertations from the data set of BA professors and some
observations from the registers. Starting in 1990 the DNB data set provides the full
coverage of all PhD students in BA in Germany.8 As assumed before, the percentage
of female students is strongly increasing over time starting from nearly 0 % in 1970
and increasing to nearly 30 % in 2006. Due to the lower number of observation, the
fluctuation in the graph is quite strong in the first part of the sample (1970-1989). This
makes the results more sensitive to outliers. In this first part, the volatility is noticeably
higher than in the second period with very low deviations from a common trend. Esti-
mating the increase in percentage of women making their PhD leads to a coefficient of
0.71 (0.000) for the whole sample from 1970 till 2006.9 Reducing the sample to the core
period (1990-2006) leads to nearly the same result (0.72*** with p-value = 0.000). Both
estimations are highly significant and fit the data very well, as Figure 3.4 demonstrates.
Next, the same analysis is shown in Figure 3.5 for professors beginning with the
number of professors and the gender composition. Starting up from nearly no profes-
sors in BA in 1971, the number increases till the end of the eighties where it plateaus
fluctuating around a value slightly below 60. We see that the number of female pro-
fessors started rising in the early eighties staying at a comparatively low level till the
beginning of the nineties. This can be seen most easily in Figure 3.6. Looking at per-
centages we see an enormous peak in the beginning of the time line between 1973 and
8The criteria for being a BA student in this data set are described in section 3.
9The p-value indicating the level of significance is always given in parentheses unless otherwise
noted.
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Figure 3.4: Increase in Female Dissertations over Years
The graph displays the percentage of females among new PhDs in BA. The data set
includes a smaller sample till 1983 only. A fitted graph is also included in the diagram.
1977. This is an outlier of one woman in interaction with the low overall number of BA
professors creating the peak.
Figure 3.5: Distribution of Professors over Years, conditioned on gender
This bar chart provides the number of professors in BA in Germany and its development
over the years.
Starting in 1977 the graph reflects the observations from the bar chart. Figure 3.7
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Figure 3.6: Increase in Percentage of Female Professors over Years (1971 to 2006)
The graph displays the percentage of female professors in BA. The data set includes a
smaller sample till 1983 only. A fitted graph is also included in the diagram.
also includes a fitted trend. Unlike the approximation for the dissertations (Figure
3.6), most of the points are below the fitted graph between 1984 and 2000 and all later
values are exceeding it. Apparently, this linear estimation does not seem to be a good
fit. Hence, this could be a hint for a structural break. For this reason the following
breakpoint regression is estimated: fem_perc = α + β t + γ t× Ib + δ Ib + εt. Ib is a
dummy variable becoming one for breakpoint period b and later.
To evaluate an appropriate year for the breakpoint, several regressions were per-
formed (1994, 1991 and 1989) and are summarized in Table 3.2.10 A change is very
likely as the coefficient incorporating the change in trend is highly significant in all
cases. Due to the lowest p-values and the strongest change in trend, Figure 3.8 shows
the new fitted values allowing for a break in 1994.
The regressions above were performed for the displayed period from 1977 to 2006.
To check the robustness of this breakpoint regression, it is repeated for two additional
starting years 1971 and 1977, each with breakpoint in 1994. As Table 3.3 reveals, the
significance of the breakpoint can be found independently of the starting year. How-
ever, we see changes in the slope for the first half of the regression when including more
years. Including years till 1977 leads to a less pronounced increase as there were no
female professors before 1984 and after 1977. Starting in 1971 makes the slope even
negative because of the peak induced by the one pioneer woman holding a professorship
in BA from 1974 to 1976.
10The regressions also allow for a change in the constant. The constant is adjusting as well, which
is not displayed in the tables as the focus is on the change in trends.
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Figure 3.7: Increase in Percentage of Female Professors over Years (1977 to 2006)
The graph displays the percentage of female professors in BA for a sample starting in
1977. A fitted graph is also included in the diagram.
Figure 3.8: Percentage of Female Professors fitted with breakpoint in 1994
The graph displays the percentage of female professors in BA including a graph resulting
from a breakpoint regression with breakpoint in 1994.
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Table 3.2: Different Breakpoints in Slope
Dependent Variable: Regression I Regression II Regression III
fem_perct (b=1994) (b=1991) (b=1989)
time 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005**
[0.000] [0.002] [0.019]
time× Ib 0.0130*** 0.010*** 0.009***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Ib -25.809*** -20.717*** -17.051***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
const. -7.180*** -8.601*** -9.107**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.020]
n 30 30 30
R2 0.952 0.943 0.9272
This table displays the statistics for the breakpoint regression on the number of female
professors over a period from 1977 till 2006. Ib is a dummy variable becoming one for
breakpoint period b and later. The breakpoint b is varied between 1994, 1991 and 1989.
P-Values are provided in parentheses.
Table 3.3: Different Periods with Breakpoint in 1994
Dependent Variable: Regression I Regression II Regression III
fem_perct (t0 = 1971) (t0 = 1977) (t0 = 1984)
time 0.002 0.004*** 0.001
[0.361] [0.000] [0.501]
time× I1994 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.0015***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
I1994 -36.667*** -25.809*** -30.076***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
const. 3.678 -7.18*** -2.913
[0.356] [0.000] [0.507]
n 36 30 23
R2 0.5243 0.943 0.940
As an additional check for robustness of the results, this table displays the statistics
for the breakpoint regression on the number of female professors with different starting
periods t0. I1994 is a dummy variable becoming one for the breakpoint period 1994 and
later. P-Values are provided in parentheses.
Finally, Figure 3.9 presents growth rates for three periods for the percentage of
women on all students completing their PhD on the one hand and the percentage of
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female professors on the other hand. The first section is from 1985 to 1990 taking 1985
as base year. Over this period, the increase in dissertations is pretty huge, as the per-
centage more than doubles, while the growth in professorships is only slightly different
from zero. Regarding the next two sections the picture becomes a totally different one.11
Now, the percentage of female professors increases drastically with nearly the same rate
as dissertations did beforehand and only becoming a little bit less pronounced in the
last period, while the percentage of females making their doctoral degree is staying
fairly constant at around 0.4.
Figure 3.9: Growth Rates of the Percentage of Females
This bar chart provides growth rates for female dissertations and professorships. The
base year is always the first year of each period.
Initially, observing the small number of female professors could lead to the presump-
tion of a problem often called ’glass ceiling’ meaning that women are able to reach a
certain stage of career as well as their male colleges but are mostly unable to reach any
higher position in hierarchy. There are several papers about women in science as by
Monroe et al. (2008) and Rossi (1965) giving different explanations for this observed
effect. Possible reasons are said to be early family influence, a higher interest in social
interaction on the women’s side, career interruption or a priority of marriage for females,
saying that it is more important for females to whom they are married to and what the
husband is working as their own stage of career, leading to negligence or harshly spo-
ken sabotage of their own career in favor of a good catch. Bain and Cummings (2000)
summarize these reasons for distinctions in careers as result of the cultural background
meaning unstated norms in society. Empirically, Ferrer and Azmat (2013) verified dif-
ferent career aspiration between men and women which underlines the arguments above.
11The base year is again the first year of each period.
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The above analysis shows that the transition rates from PhD to professorship con-
verged for male and female students around 1998. Before 1990 the increase in the
percentage of female professors was close to zero but then it increased drastically as the
growth rates reveal. This development could be pinned down in a breakpoint regression
where the breakpoint seems to be somewhere in the beginning of the nineties. Inter-
estingly, in the nineties there were introduced several changes in law to give females a
better opportunity to become a professor as their male colleagues.12 Starting in 1991
these changes where implemented in several German federal states. These legal changes
will be subject of Section 4.3. Despite the fact, that these changes coincide with the
German reunion, a corresponding analysis does not yield further insights due to the
small number of professors in Eastern Germany.
Overall, the situation of female professors does not look like a glass ceiling problem
from the stage of PhD students to professors. However, the low number of females
(PhD students as well as professors) is still immanent and probably culturally founded.
It would be up for discussion, whether affirmative actions for female PhD students
would keep the high transition rate to professorship upright or if it would just lead
to an increase of females making their doctoral degree but then opting out before the
professor’s stage.
4.2 Comparison to Data from the US
In order to bring the data from Germany into an international context, we will use US
data for comparison. Burrelli (2008) investigated the percentage of women among US
PhD students as well as professors using National Science Foundation (NSF) Data. For
this comparison the same data set is used. The NSF provides data from the National
Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES) which is one of 13 federal sta-
tistical agencies in the US. They make periodical national surveys and collect other
national data in the context of research and development, paying special attention to
STEM education (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics).
First, we will have a look at the percentage of females making their PhD, displayed
in Figure 3.10. The US data set reaches from 1958 to 2006. The German data set
starts in 1970 on the same low level as engineering in the US. From there on, the female
percentage in engineering is increasing in both countries, but, the percentage in BA in
Germany is rising even more, reaching the fraction of women in mathematics in the last
years observed. However, the percentage of female PhDs in BA locates between two
fields that are fairly male dominated as the average percentage over all fields shows and
fare away from the US percentage in social science.
Performing the same comparison regarding professorships we recognize a surprising
pattern (Figure 3.11). The German graph starts out on one level with the percentage
of US mathematicians data set in 1984. The data set for engineering starts in 1985 at a
certainly lower level. Here, we have to take into account that the number of professors
in Germany is just increasing and not very large meaning a small amount of females
12A list of the legislative texts with the corresponding year of publication is provided in the appendix.
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Figure 3.10: Development of German Dissertations in Comparison to Data from the
US
This diagram compares the development of the percentage of females making a doctoral
degree in BA in Germany to the US in various fields using data from the National
Science Foundation (NSF).
is having a stronger impact on a small total of BA professors. Till 1993, the amount
of females in BA has shrunk towards the level of engineers in the US. From there
on, it overshoots the percentage in mathematics and even the overall fraction leveling
with the representation of females in social sciences in the US in the last years observed.
The change in trend for female BA professors can not be found in the US for any
kind of studies, as there is a non-kinked smooth increase in percentages in the US. This,
again, hints on an external impact on the percentage of female professors in Germany.
Furthermore, it could be seen that the percentage of female PhDs in Germany in the
field of BA is far below the comparable field of social sciences in the US.
4.3 German Equality Laws
This section will have a deeper look at German gender equality laws. First, a short
overview on the historical main steps in gender equality concerning the legal system
will be given13 : The first equality law was commenced in 1958. Prior to that, the hus-
band could decide if his wife is allowed to work and could quit her job without notice.
In 1980, a new law was introduced to facilitate equal treatment at work and in 1994
the second equality law followed, which focuses mostly on equal job opportunities for
women. The last one was accompanied by new laws in federal states concerning gender
13The historical classification is abstracted from LpB (1996) “Dokumentation: Unsere Stadt braucht
Frauen - Unser Kreis braucht Frauen”.
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Figure 3.11: Development of German Professorships in Comparison to US Data
This diagram compares the development of the percentage of female professors in BA in
Germany to the US in various flies using data from the National Science Foundation.
equality in public service. All these laws were commenced during the nineties.
As these federal laws for public service apply for universities, in particular for the
hiring process of new professors, an event study will be performed to align the effects of
the changes in law in all federal states. For this purpose the year of the commencement
is normalized to period zero. This way the analysis remains its statistical power instead
of splitting the dataset federal state wise by introducing controls for the change in law.
Recalling the idea of the breakpoint regression performed in Section 4.1, the break-
point itself is now intrinsically given by the event period zero. The corresponding
regression is performed as follows: fem_perc = α + β t + γ t × Ie + δ Ie + εt. The
dependent variable fem_perci is the percentage of female professors in period i and Ie
is a dummy variable switching to one for all periods after the event. It can be expected
that before and after the commencement, behavior could already have been changed
earlier or needed a while to adapt. To exclude this noise there are some periods ex-
cluded around the event. The index e indicates how many years have been left out
before and after the event.
Table 3.4 shows that, already without leaving out any transition period, regression
I indicates significant changes when compared to the increase in the percentage of fe-
male professors before and after the commencement of the new laws. By increasing the
transition period the explanatory power of the performed regressions II to IV becomes
even better.
Interestingly, two types of equality laws can be distinguished. Some federal states
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Figure 3.12: Change in Public Service Gender Equality Laws
This diagram shows the increase in the percentage of female professors in the dataset.
The year of introduction of the federal gender equality law in public service is set to zero.
The fitted graphs display the performed breakpoint regression leaving out a transition
period of three years before and after the event.
Table 3.4: Change in Laws
Dep.Var.: Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression IV
fem_perc e = 0 e = 1 e = 2 e = 3
time 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001]
Ie -0.033** -0.032** -0.039** -0.055***
[0.016] [0.034] [0.025] [0.008]
time× Ie 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.022***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
const. 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.047***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
n 35 33 31 29
R2 0.961 0.97 0.973 0.976
This table displays the influence of the introduction of the new equality law on the
percentage of female professors fem_perci using the normalized data set with the year
the new law has been introduced in each federal state set to period zero. Ie is a dummy
variable switching to one for all periods after the event and the index e indicates how
many years have been left out before and after the event. P-Values are provided in
parentheses.
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included a priority rule, meaning in case of equal qualification the female applicant
has to become favor. 12 federal states chose to include this priority rule into the
law: Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania, Lower Saxony,
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, Berlin, Saarland, Thuringia
and Northrhein-Westphalia. Four federal states chose not to do so, all of them being
located in the south of Germany. Only Saxony is a previously eastern federal state
while Bavaria, Hesse and Baden-Wuerttemberg are previously western federals states.
Figure 3.13: Development with and without Priority Rule
This diagram shows the increase in the percentage of female professors in the dataset
distinguishing between laws with and without a priority rule. The year of introduction
of the federal gender equality law in public service is set to zero.
To evaluate if there is a difference in the percentage of female professors regarding
the two law types the following regression was performed: fem_perc = α+ β t+ γ t×
Ip + δ Ip + εt. Ip is a dummy variable indicating that the priority rule is introduced in
these federal states. Again, the dataset with the event period set to zero was used.
Regression I (Table 3.5) shows significant difference in the percentage of female
professors regarding the period after the event. However, it looks like the values of the
federal states without the priority rule are mostly below those of the federal states with
priority rule, especially in the first years after the commencement. To address this,
regression 2 includes data only till 10 periods after the event. Now, weak significancy
appears regarding a difference in slopes.
Testing for significant differences in federal states before the event can be rejected
as regression III reveals. For this reason, it can be assumed that the constant for the
regression regarding the post event period will be the same. In consequence, the as-
sumption δ = 0 is introduced which allows to bring more statistical power to find a
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potential difference in slopes as the observations after the event are limited and may be
too few to pin down a smaller difference. Indeed, regression IV resembling regression II
with the same constant for both types of laws, leads to highly significant differences in
the first 10 years after the event. Regression V, repeating the first regression with the
new assumption, now even shows significant differences in the whole post event period.
This event study showed significant changes comparing the period before and after
the commencement of the new gender equality laws in the nineties. It seems that a
priority rule leads at least to a faster effect on gender equality. Whether a priority rule
is more powerful in the long run than a law without has to be investigated at a later
point in time.
4.4 Faculty Composition
As the data set provides information on the university of each professorship, this sec-
tion tests the hypothesis that gender composition is correlated with upcoming hiring
decisions. Consequently, the relationship between faculty size and the share of women
is investigated.14
The percentage of female professors at a faculty might influence the hiring decision
in different ways. The first hypothesis is, that female professors will be allocated at fac-
ulties where the percentage of females is higher. The paper by Rivera (2012) describes
this effect as cultural matching. Konrad and Pfeffer (1991) observe a similar pattern
calling it demographic group power using data of hiring process for higher university
administrative positions. In this case, the effect could be caused by different actions:
On the one hand, female professors at a faculty could be influencing the hiring decision
towards new female professors. On the other hand, female professors could tend to
apply to faculties having a higher number of females.15 The second hypothesis implies
that the fact of having a low percentage of female professors produces social pressure
to increase the number of females more strongly to achieve more gender equality. The
corresponding probit regression yields fem_hirei = α + β femi + εi with femi as
percentage of females at a faculty at the time of hiring and fem_hirei as probability
to be hired as woman.
We get a strong and significant positive correlation (Table 3.6) supporting the first
hypothesis. Including the year of hiring as yeari results in the regression fem_hirei =
α+ β femi + γ yeari + εi. In consequence the significancy disappears. Thus, there is a
positive correlation between the percentage of female professors and new females being
hired. This might be due to the fact that in times when we had a lower percentage
of female professors there were also less potential female professors available to hire
over the years both the number of female professors and the number of female PhDs
increased as seen in Section 4.1. This result is robust against changes in the examined
14Faculty size is measured by the total number of full professors, here.
15Unfortunately, we do not observe who applied for a professorship so we are not able to potentially
disentangle both effects.
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period. Regression 3 provides the result for the corresponding analysis to regression 2
for years after 1994.16
To achieve a better understanding of the distribution of female professors over the
different faculties, Figure 3.14 displays the relationship between the number of full pro-
fessors and the number of female professors at a faculty in a scatterplot. Most faculties
do not exceed a number of 2 female professors. Considering faculties with more than
12 full professors in total, only, a positive relation between the two observed features
becomes apparent. As already described in Section 4.1, there is a structural break in
the data set. In consequence, it appears to be conclusive to split the data in two periods.
Figure 3.14: The Number of Female Professors vs. the Total Number of Professors
This scatter plot displays the number of female professors at a faculty against the total
number of professors working there for the whole data set.
(a) Before the Breakpoint (b) After the Breakpoint
Figure 3.15: Scatterplots for Splitted Sample before and after the Breakpoint in 1994
These scatter plots display the number of female professors at a faculty against the total
number of professors working there for two different periods in time.
16This starting point is chosen because 1994 is the breakpoint detected in Section 4.1.
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Table 3.5: Effects of Priority Rule
Dep.Var.: Reg. I Reg. II Reg. III Reg. IV Reg. V
dem_perc 1 < t < 13 1 < t < 10 −22 < t < −1 1 < t < 10 1 < t < 13
time 0.02*** 0.016*** 0.002** 0.015*** 0.017***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.020] [0.000] [0.000]
Ip × time 0.001 0.012** 0.001 0.011*** 0.005**
[0.843] [0.049] [0.320] [0.000] [0.026]
Ip 0.037 -0.008 0.018 - -
[0.321] [0.827] [0.269]
const. 0.007 0.025 0.045*** -0.034** 0.035**
[0.793] [0.305] [0.000] [0.021] [0.035]
n 26 20 42 22 28
R2 0.773 0.836 0.394 0.835 0.804
This table displays regressions investigating differences in the federal states having in-
troduced the new equality law with and with a priority rule on the percentage of female
professors fem_perci using the normalized data set with the year the new law has been
introduced in each federal state set to period zero. Ip is the dummy variable indicating
that a priority rule has been introduced. P-Values are provided in parentheses.
Table 3.6: Probability for Hiring a Female Professor
Dependent Variable: Regression I Regression II Regression III
fem_hirei
femi 1.042** 0.583 0.508
[0.011] [0.207] [0.308]
yeari - 0.042** 0.046
[0.019] [0.278]
const. -1.382*** -86.028** -94.075
[0.000] [0.017] [0.265]
n 211 211 93
pseudo-R2 0.043 0.085 0.044
Regression I displays the correlation between the percentage of females at a faculty
(femi) and the probability for a female Professor to be hired (fem_hirei). In Regres-
sion II and III it is controlled for the year of hiring and Regression III is restricted to
data after the breakpoint in 1994. P-Values are provided in parentheses.
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Figure 3.15 displays the same scatterplot for two particular periods: The first part
includes all data till 1994, which resembles the breakpoint derived in Section 4.1, while
the second part contains all observations after 1994. The decomposition of the data set
reveals two different patterns. In the first period the majority of faculties tend to have
at most one female professor and small faculties even non. In contrast, the second part
of the sample is subdivided into small and large faculties. While small faculties with
up to 8 full professors have up to 2 female colleagues, the larger faculties exhibit the
positive relationship already visible in Figure 3.14.
In order to pin down the relationships described above in a quantitative way the pro-
bit regression numb_femj = α+β sizej+εj was performed. The variable numb_femi
represents the number of female professors at a faculty while the total number of pro-
fessors at the faculties is given by sizei. Table 3.7 displays the corresponding results.
Regarding the whole sample, the coefficient yields 0.1825, meaning barely 20 % of the
faculty members (full professors) in the whole sample are female. Performing this re-
gression for the sample before 1994 reveals a ratio of less than 10 %. In contrast, the
sample after 1994 exhibits a proportion of even more than 23 %. Thus, for the second
part of the sample there is a 1 to 3 ratio on average. Increasing the starting year of the
second sample to 1998 leads to a coefficient of 25 %, while setting it to 2002 of about
30 %. Meanwhile, a decrease in significance is noticeable which is expectable as the
sample size is reducing correspondingly. The negative sign of the constant appearing in
all regressions might depict a tendency to adjust the share of females downwards rather
than upwards. Summing up, the analysis features changes in gender composition of
full professors at the faculties regarding samples before and after 1994. After 1994, the
gender composition seems to follow a ratio of approximately one quarter with increasing
tendency.
Table 3.7: Influences on the Number of Female Professors
Dep.Var.: Reg. I Reg. II Reg. III Reg. IV Reg. V
numb_femj total ≤ 1994 > 1994 > 1998 > 2002
size 0.182*** 0.072*** 0.238*** 0.250*** 0.303***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
const. -0.137*** -0.060*** -0.120*** -0.101*** -0.108***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
n 901 456 445 316 171
R2 0.401 0.172 0.544 0.601 0.689
These regressions show the correlation between the number of professors working at a
faculty (sizei) and the number of female professors working there (numb_femi) for
different time periods. P-Values are provided in parentheses.
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4.5 Influences on Doctoral Students
The last section of the analysis focuses on factors correlating with the decision of PhD
students to become a professor. There are three parameters I am going to investigate:
the influence of the percentage of female fellow students, the influence of the percentage
of female professors at the PhD student’s faculty and the supervisors’ gender.17
The average percentage of female students is 23 %, varying between 0 % and 66 %.
To investigate which influences the decision to stay in academia (job_choichei) the
following probit regression is performed with different measures of the composition of
cohorts: job_choicei = α + β compi + γ femi + δ compi × femi + εi.
The first row of Table 3.8 shows the corresponding probit regression on the per-
centage of female PhD students.18 Both effects are negative, but, the additional effect
on women is significantly less negative than the general effect. Interestingly, the same
regressions performed with other related parameters such as the number of female stu-
dents, the number of male students and the total number of students provided in Table
3.8 have negative general effects that are a lot less pronounced. Additionally, we do
not see the significantly different effect on females as found for the percentages. The
relative variable gives more impact to the smaller universities with a high percentage
of females than the absolute numbers do, meaning the effect is even stronger at small
universities with a high percentage of women.
Since the effect is generally negative it could be caused by other values in life of
women such as wanting to contribute something to society, founding a family (Rossi,
1965; Monroe et al., 2008). Maybe with a higher percentage of females they are becom-
ing more powerful as a peer group strengthening their values and even transferring it
to the other sex.19 As the effect is probably driven by smaller universities with a high
fraction of females it could also be that men do not feel comfortable being surrounded
by a larger amount of women.20
It has already been pointed out in the literature section that role models can have
a strong influence on behavior. Female professors could be seen as role models for
PhD students at a faculty encouraging them to become professor, as well. This leads
to the hypothesis that women have an additional positive effect on the probability of
women becoming professors compared to their influence on men becoming professors.
The corresponding probit regression indicating the influence of the presence of a female
professor (influencei) on the decision to stay in academia (job_choicei) appears as
follows: job_choicei = α + β influencei + γ femi + δ influencei × femi + εi. It is
17In this section, effects are assumed to be constant over time.
18As there could be variations in the percentage of females during the PhD time, the average per-
centage of females over the studying time is used.
19In her analysis Sax (2001) recognized a strong influence of peer mean regarding scientific orienta-
tion.
20Heterogeneous groups can have impact on the evaluation of the own performance. Baugh and
Graen (1997) found out that the evaluation of performance decreases when the team becomes hetero-
geneous.
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Table 3.8: Influence of other PhD Students on Job Choice
Dep. Var.: Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression IV
job_choicei fem_perc numb_fem numb_male total_numb
compi -3.909*** -0.024*** -0.007*** -0.012***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
tcompi × femi 1.611*** -0.002 0.001 -0.001
[0.005] [0.590] [0.636] [0.805]
femi -0.465*** -0.150** -0.282*** -0.251***
[0.001] [0.042] [0.000] [0.001]
const. -0.92 *** -1.284*** -1.256*** -1.232***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
n 21494 21494 21494 21494
pseudo-R2 0.058 0.068 0.053 0.060
These regressions display the influence on the composition of the cohort (compi) on the
job decision (job_choicei). Regression I uses the female percentage, Regression II The
total number of females, Regression III the total number of males and Regression IV
the total number of fellow students making their PhD at the same faculty. P-Values are
provided in parentheses.
distinguished between having at least one year spend with at lest one female professor
around and at least two years. There does not seem to be a strong change in an increas-
ing number of female professors, hence, the investigation only longs for the existence of
at least one female professor. The results are given in Table 3.9.
There is an additional significant effect for females, meaning the effect on male is
0.119 while the effect on females is 0.219. Including students experiencing at least two
years with a female professor at the same time, the effect gets stronger but more noisy.21
This could be caused by the even smaller sample resulting in a less powerful regression.
Surprisingly, we find a positive effect on male students, too. Interestingly even this
effect is higher when having spent longer time at a gender mixed faculty. There is no
obvious reason why women are also encouraging men to stay in academia. Possibly, the
presence of female professors changes the atmosphere or the way of teaching.
The above investigation has shown that the gender composition of the faculty is
indeed correlated with the decision of becoming a professor. The supervisor can be
expected to have an even more pronounced influence on a PhD student. To examine
this hypothesis the following probit regression was performed to investigate the influ-
ence of students’ gender (femi) and supervisors’ gender (supi)22 on the job decision
(job_choicei): job_choicei = α + β femi + γ supi + δ femi × supi + εi.The first re-
gression in Table 3.10 shows the probability to become a professor for those students
21It is significant to a 10 % level instead of a 5 % level.
22Dummy variables always indicate female as 1 and male as 0.
4. ANALYSIS 89
Table 3.9: Influence of Female Percentages at Faculties
Dependent Variable: Regression I Regression II
job_choicei min 1 year min 2 years
influencei 0.119*** 0.468***
[0.000] [0.000]
influencei × femi 0.100** 0.319*
[0.033] [0.065]
femi -0.447*** -0.429***
[0.000] [0.000]
const. -1.488*** -1.494***
[0.000] [0.000]
n 4575 4575
pseudo-R2 0.039 0.032
Theres probit regressions display the influence of the presence of a female professor
(influencei) on the decision to stay in academia (job_choicei). It is distinguished
between having at least one year spend with at lest one female professor around (Re-
gression I) and at least two years (Regression II). P-Values are provided in parentheses.
who have a male supervisor. The next column provides the same regression for those
having a female supervisor. We see a lower probability for female students to become
professor in general, but, the reduction seems to be slightly less pronounced in case of
a female supervisor. However, the coefficient in the second regression is not significant
– which could also be caused by the extremely small number of 198 female supervisors.
Regression 3 shows the influence of the supervisor’s gender on the probability of
becoming a professor independent of the student’s gender. Here, we see no significant
influence. Finally, regression 4 gives neither a significant correlation for the super-
visor’s gender nor the interaction between the supervisor’s and the student’s gender.
This explains that the difference between the parameters in regression 1 and 2 are not
displaying a significant disparity. Only the lower probability of females to become pro-
fessor stays significant, which is driven by the lower percentage of women becoming
professor before 1998 (Figure 3.2).
Summing up, although the gender composition of the faculty shows a strong cor-
relation with the career decision, no comparable relation can be found regarding the
supervisor’s gender. The analysis shows that the gender of a supervisor does not have
an influence on the probability of becoming a professor and, in consequence, no different
influence on female than on male students. There is one interesting observation left,
regarding the supervisors: Regressing the supervisor’s gender on the student’s gender
gives a correlation of 0.34*** (0.000) that is significantly different from zero. This
means, female students tend to be supervised by female professors more often.
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Table 3.10: Probability of Becoming a Professor Depending on the Supervisor
Dep. Var.: Reg. I Reg. II Reg. III Reg. IV
job_choicei male sup fem sup
femi -0.325*** -0.210 - -0.326***
[0.000] [0.293] [0.000]
supi - - -0.184* -0.181
[0.052] [0.110]
femi × supi - - - 0.116
[0.581]
const. -1.098 -1.279 -1.165 -1.098
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
n 5100 371 5534 5471
pseudo-R2 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.009
These regressions indicate the influence of students gender (femi) and supervisors gen-
der (supi) on the job decision (job_choicei). The first regression restricts the investiga-
tion on the student’s gender and was performed on the subgroup with male supervisors
only, while the second one was performed on the subgroup with female supervisors.
Regression III limits the influence of the supervisor’s gender while regression IV in-
corporates all factors. Dummy variables always indicate female as 1 and male as 0.
P-Values are provided in parentheses.
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The analysis has shown that there have been distinct changes over the last decades.
On the one hand, the amount of dissertations has doubled from 1990 to 2009 while the
percentage of PhDs deciding to become a professor has decreased to a number below
1 %. On the other hand, the number of professors has increased from below 10 in the
seventies to over 60 in 1988. However, only 5 % of the overall number of professors in
1988 were women. In 2005 the share of female students as well as professors reached a
level of around one quarter. While this is a huge increase, one quarter could be seen as
still fairly small. Interestingly, the transition rate from doctoral students to professors
has become equal for men and women in 1998. Thus, the number of females relative to
all female PhDs who choose to become professors is the same as the number of males
becoming professor. Due to the smaller fraction of females completing a PhD the frac-
tion of women can be seen as adequate.
We have also seen a stronger increase in the female percentage of professors than for
students over the years and even more, a change in trend for female professors. This
change, taking place around 1994, seems to be related to affirmative action policies by
some German federal states regarding the hiring decisions for female professors. When
seen in this international context, the fraction of female students is below the US aver-
age. The strong increase in female professors, probably caused by political and social
changes in Germany, has pushed the amount of female professors in BA in Germany
above the US average and reached the same level as social sciences in the US. During
the nineties, German federal states have introduced laws to enforce gender equality in
hiring decisions. The corresponding event study showed significant changes comparing
the period before and after the commencement of the new gender equality laws in the
nineties. It seams that a priority rule leads at least to a faster implementation of an
increase in female professors. Whether a priority rule is more powerful in the long run
then a law without cannot be finally seen within this data set.
Despite the changes in gender equality laws the implementation of a quota for profes-
sors was always renounced. However, the composition of full professors at the faculties
follows a ratio of approximately one quarter with increasing tendency. This resembles
the fraction of females completing a PhD. The question arises if either the transition
rate, which appears to be the same for men and women since 1998, is resulting in this
even distribution of females, or the unwritten quota – maybe formed by social leverage
on the faculties hiring decisions – is resulting in the aligned transition rates. The di-
rection of causality cannot be pinned down with this data set. However, the analysis
revealed that the faculty composition itself does not seem to have any influence on the
gender of the next professor being hired.
Finally, testing for influences on PhD students’ decisions to become professors
showed that both the percentage of female fellow students as well as the percentage
of female professors at a faculty, are related with this career decision. Surprisingly,
both effects point in the opposite direction. Female professors have a positive influence
on the probability of becoming professor on both male and female students. However,
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the influence is stronger on females. So, the female professors could act as role models
for female students. However, this effect seems to be existent even for male students.
This means, a higher percentage of female professors at a faculty increases the attrac-
tiveness of becoming a professor in general. Possible reasons would be an improved
professional environment as well as different teaching methods. Looking at female fel-
low students, their presence seems to have a negative impact on the decision in general
as well. In this case, the effect is less pronounced for females, though. Although, super-
visors are playing an important role in the career of doctoral students, the data show
no significant influence for them acting as role models. In consequence, the faculty,
meaning their scientific environment, seems to be more defining for PhD students than
their supervisors. Interestingly, the supervisor’s gender does not seem to play a role
in career decisions, but the decision for a supervisor is connected to his or her gender.
Female students tend to have a female supervisor significantly more often. This does
not strictly imply that female students prefer to choose female supervisors. It could
also be possible that female students are rejected by male supervisors. Hence, they
would be forced to choose a female supervisor.
This raises another question: If there were more female supervisors, would this in-
crease the number of female PhD students? We have seen that they do not influence the
decision to become a professor. However, we also found the rate of becoming professor
to be equal for men and women. If the transition rate stayed unaffected, an increase
in the percentage of female PhD students would result in a proportional increase of
female professors. Nevertheless, it is possible that the transition rate would not stay
constant as it is likely that the fraction of women being able to become a PhD as well
as a professor and willing to decide for this career is still low in society. Women who
already choosing a career in academia seem to be able to handle the present situation.
In order to increase their number, there are two possible approaches: first, by making
a professorship more attractive for women – for themselves as well as society. Second,
by enabling them to become a professor by providing the appropriate education. The
second point itself has again a lot to do with the women’s self-concept as well as the
social environment. Science is still seen as unfeminine. If female students continue to
avoid choosing sciences as subjects, they will not have the chance to decide whether
they want to become a science professor or not as they will not be qualified.
Summing up, a lot has changed in the field of BA regarding gender equality. Those
women deciding to do a doctorate are behaving like their male colleagues and the insti-
tutional changes allow them to behave equally in the decision of becoming a professor.
There does not seem to be an invisible barrier left from PhD to a professorship as the
percentage of female PhDs and professors in BA is nearly the same. Comparing to data
from the US, this is outstanding as the fraction of females is distinctively smaller for
professors than for PhD students in the US. In this regard, the field of BA in Germany
performs reasonably well with respect to gender equality. While the development for
female BA professors in Germany can be seen as positive and encouraging, the percent-
age of female PhD students in BA in Germany is rather disillusioning and demands for
action if it is desired to adjust to the US in this concern.
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During the nineties, there have been several legislation amendments in order to increase
gender equality in the recruitment process of professors.
• Bremen (1990): Gesetz zur Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann im öffentlichen
Dienst des Landes Bremen (Landesgleichstellungsgesetz)
• Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (1998): Gesetz zur Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann
im öffentlichen Dienst des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Gleichstellungsge-
setz - GlG M-V)
• Niedersachsen (1994): Niedersächsisches Gleichberechtigungsgesetz
• Brandenburg (1994): Gesetz zur Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern im öf-
fentlichen Dienst im Land Brandenburg (Landesgleichstellungsgesetz – LGG)
• Hamburg (1991): Gesetz zur Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern im ham-
burgischen öffentlichen Dienst (Gleichstellungsgesetz)
• Sachsen-Anhalt (1997): Frauenfördergesetz (FrFG) Sachsen-Anhalt
• Schleswig-Holstein (1994): Gesetz zur Gleichstellung der Frauen im öffentlichen
Dienst (GstG)
• Berlin (1991): Landesgleichstellungsgesetz zur Gleichstellung von Frauen und
Männern im Berliner Landesdienst (LGG)
• Saarland (1996): Landesgleichstellungsgesetz - LGG Saarland
• Thüringen (1998): Thüringer Gleichstellungsgesetz (ThürGleichG)
• Baden-Württemberg (1995): Landesgleichberechtigungsgesetz
• Sachsen (1994): Gesetz zur Förderung von Frauen und der Vereinbarkeit von Fam-
ilie und Beruf im öffentlichen Dienst im Freistaat Sachsen (Sächsisches Frauen-
förderungsgesetz – SächsFFG)
• Bayern (1996): Bayerisches Gesetz zur Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern
• Hessen (1993): Hessisches Gesetz über die Gleichberechtigung von Frauen und
Männern und zum Abbau von Diskriminierungen von Frauen in der öffentlichen
Verwaltung (Hessisches Gleichberechtigungsgesetz - HGlG)
• NRW (1999): Gesetz zur Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern für das Land
Nordrhein-Westfalen (Landesgleichstellungsgesetz - LGG)
• Rheinland-Pfalz (1995): Landesgleichstellungsgesetz (LGG) Rheinland-Pfalz
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